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I. INTRODUCTION
When legislatures enact statutes, furtherance of legislative intent
depends on the behavior of actors in the executive and judicial
branches of government.  In the criminal justice system, prosecutors
may frustrate legislative intent when they exercise prosecutorial dis-
cretion.  This Article examines an instance in which prosecutors’
choices work to the detriment of children.  This troubling outcome is
poignantly exemplified by the prosecution of juvenile prostitution
cases.
University researchers conservatively estimated that 244,000
American children in the year 2000 were “at risk” of becoming victims
of sexual exploitation—including prostitution.1  While researchers
could not precisely ascertain the number of juveniles actually partici-
pating in prostitution, they offered some generalizations about the
characteristics of juveniles engaged in that practice.  Most prostituted
juveniles are girls whose average age when first engaging in prostitu-
tion is twelve to fourteen years.2  The vast majority of prostituted girls
are runaways, throwaways, or homeless; have been neglected and
abused by their parents; and end up sexually exploited by pimps.3
These girls’ lives are full of violence and threats.4  They are discon-
nected from family and friends, suffer from physical and emotional
maladies, and may be drug-dependent.5
The United States Department of Justice has made it a priority in
the last five years to prosecute U.S.-based pimps trafficking in
juveniles.6  The Department initiates federal cases and has estab-
lished state-federal partnerships to assist in state-level prosecutions.7
Some of these pimp prosecutions are resolved through trial rather
1. RICHARD J. ESTES & NEIL ALAN WEINER, UNIV. OF PA., THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN THE U.S., CANADA AND MEXICO 143 (2001).
2. Id. at 92.
3. Id. at 60, 68.
4. Id. at 68.
5. Id. at 75–89.
6. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Innocence Lost Initiative (Dec. 15,
2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/innocencelost%20FACT
FINAL_121605.pdf.
7. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Announces
Human Trafficking Task Force in the District of Columbia and Grants for Law
Enforcement to Fight Human Trafficking and Assist Victims (Nov. 23, 2004),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/archives/pressreleases/2004/DOJ04760.
htm; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Five Arrested in Houston Sex Traffick-
ing Case (Aug. 25, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/Press
%20Releases/SDTX_FIVE-ARRESTED_08-25-09.pdf.
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than guilty plea.8  When a case proceeds to trial, the juvenile is likely
to be a prosecution witness.9
Prosecution should represent a space of apparent safety—both
physically and emotionally—for the prostituted juvenile.  The court
has probably detained her pimp, thereby limiting his influence over
her, and government officials can also provide her with ameliorative
social and educational services.  Yet, the adjudicatory process itself
places burdens on the juvenile, particularly when the case proceeds to
trial.  At times, the government detains as material witnesses girls
who are especially reluctant to cooperate with an investigation, so
much so they might choose to flee before testifying.10  At trial, the ju-
venile confronts the difficult and traumatic task of recounting epi-
sodes of sexual exploitation in open court in the defendant’s
presence.11
Some juveniles who testify at trial can navigate the process with
little or no more difficulty than the ordinary witness.  Trial usually
results in conviction, and the child is either none the worse for wear or
has benefited emotionally from having her day in court.  Other teen-
age prostitutes, however, need support to cope with the general rigors
of testifying and the particularized stresses that result from having to
testify in the presence of a former victimizer.12  For these girls, the
experience of testifying will add new short-term and long-term emo-
tional and social harms to the heavy burdens already borne by being
the victims of child prostitution.13
8. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Jury Convicts Washington,
D.C. Man of Interstate Sex Trafficking of 14-Year-Old Child and 19-Year-Old
Adult (Mar. 1, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/Press%20
Releases/DC%20Brice%20PR_030106.pdf (trial); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice, New Britain Man Pleads Guilty to Federal Child Sex Trafficking Charges
(Jan. 21, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/Press%20Re
leases/DCT_Sanderson_PLEA_20110121.pdf (guilty plea).
9. See Debbie Wilgoren, Area Juvenile Sex Rings Targeted Using Anti-Trafficking
Laws, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2006, at A1; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Mo-
tor City Mink” Sentenced to 35 Years Imprisonment on Internet Child Prostitu-
tion Charges (Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://detroit.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/press
rel09/de031909.htm.
10. See Myesha K. Braden, Providing Victim-Centered Services to Prostituted Youth,
54:7 U.S. ATTYS’ BULL. 37, 41–42 (Nov. 2006); Geneva O. Brown, Little Girl Lost:
Las Vegas Metro Police Vice Division and the Use of Material Witness Holds
Against Teenaged Prostitutes, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 471, 472–73 (2008).
11. E.g., Wilgoren, supra note 9 (reporting that prostituted juveniles testified at
length in trial).
12. See id. (describing use of advocates, tissues, and stress balls while prostituted
teenagers testified).
13. See Mickey Goodman, Teen Suicide Spurs War on Child Prostitution, REUTERS,
Nov. 28, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/11/28/us-usa-
prostitution-children-idUSN0736630420071128 (reporting about a prostituted ju-
venile who committed suicide after testifying at her pimp’s trial).
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From the prosecutor’s perspective, indicting the pimp and having
the child victim available to testify at trial should be an advantageous
position.  However, special problems confront prosecutors in child-
prostitution cases.  Because of immaturity and fear, the child witness
may be uncooperative on direct examination or vulnerable to the rig-
ors of cross-examination.14  An overly stressed child may produce tes-
timony that is unreliable or difficult to test with follow-up questions.15
The child witness may refuse to answer questions at all, provide vague
or incomplete answers, or give false or misleading responses.16
The prosecutor may employ a variety of measures to help the child
witness whose effectiveness is threatened by the danger of emotional
trauma while testifying.  Pretrial, prosecutors may limit the number
of interviews, use specially trained interviewers, provide therapeutic
counseling, and prepare the child for her role as a witness, including  a
tour of the courtroom.17  Throughout the testimonial process, prosecu-
tors might provide a child witness with a stress-relieving item, such as
a hand-held ball or comforting toy, or request that a supportive adult
sit near the child.18  Additionally, prosecutors may ask that the court
monitor the locations and movements of counsel during testimony, or-
der the re-arrangement of seating during the child’s examination, or
instruct attorneys to remain seated while questioning a child
witness.19
In addition to measures generally focused on remediating harms
from testifying, a unique, particularized, and highly controversial
measure prosecutors have available to them is the practice of shield-
ing.20  Unlike other measures, shielding is aimed exclusively at
remediating the harms caused by the presence of the defendant while
the witness testifies.21  It is usually—but not exclusively—available
for very young victim-witnesses in sexual abuse cases.22
Shielding limits the ability of the juvenile witness to view the de-
fendant—and sometimes the defendant to view the witness—while
14. Kayla Bakshi & Darcy Katzin, Helping Child Victims and Witnesses Present Ef-
fective Testimony, 54:7 U.S. ATTYS’ BULL. 42, 42–43 (Nov. 2006).
15. See id. at 42–43, 46.
16. See id.; infra section II.A.
17. See Bakshi & Katzin, supra note 14, at 43–45.
18. AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CHILD
ABUSE 326–27, 441–42 (3d ed. 2004); Wilgoren, supra note 9.
19. AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., supra note 18, at 326.
20. This Article adopts the term “shielding” to describe any measure that limits the
ability of the child to view the defendant while testifying.  Jean Montoya used
this concept in her 1992 work critiquing the Supreme Court’s decision in Mary-
land v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). See Jean Montoya, On Truth and Shielding in
Child Abuse Trials, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1259, 1260 (1992).
21. Craig, 497 U.S. at 852–53.
22. See infra subsection III.D.2.b.
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the witness testifies.23  The ability to request shielding of at least
some child witnesses is available to prosecutors in virtually every ju-
risdiction.24  Most shielding laws took hold in the 1980s and 1990s,
which saw an exponential increase in reported child sex abuse cases,
excessive media coverage of notorious child sex abuse scandals, and
research indicating that sometimes children were traumatized by tes-
tifying in the presence of the defendant.25  In 1990, the Supreme
Court approved shielding in Maryland v. Craig,26 after sidestepping
the constitutionality issue in the earlier case of Coy v. Iowa.27  Justice
Scalia vigorously dissented in Craig,28 and many legal scholars joined
him in offering critiques of the majority opinion.29
Legislators, vindicated in their efforts by the Court’s decision, pre-
sumably expected that prosecutors would use the latest addition to
their trial-practice toolbox, ultimately to the benefit of both children
and the public at large.  Yet almost ten years later, survey research
revealed that prosecutors often declined to seek approval to shield ju-
venile witnesses, and more recent anecdotal evidence suggests this
trend has persisted.30  In short, it appears that the legislative aims
behind shielding—remediating harm to child witnesses and facilitat-
ing prosecution in child sex abuse cases31—have been frustrated by
the discretionary choices of prosecutors.
The failure of prosecutors to use shielding in many cases raises
serious concerns.  Especially worrisome is the risk that prosecutorial
choices have produced inequities in the treatment of different catego-
ries of child witnesses.  There is reason to believe that shielding is not
broadly available to juvenile witnesses in teenage prostitution cases,
as well as youthful witnesses in domestic violence and street crimes
cases.32  Rather, shielding is mostly limited to young children in sex
23. Craig, 497 U.S. at 854–55.
24. See infra section II.B.
25. See infra section II.A.
26. 497 U.S. at 836.
27. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988); see infra section II.C.
28. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 860 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. Craig led to the emergence of a robust body of literature on the constitutional
propriety and normative value of shielding. E.g., Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity
Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 863 (1988); Montoya,
supra note 20; Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay
Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L.
REV. 691 (1993); Peter T. Wendel, A Law and Economics Analysis of the Right to
Face-to-Face Confrontation Post-Maryland v. Craig: Distinguishing the Forest
from the Trees, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405 (1993); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Right of
Confrontation, Justice Scalia, and the Power and Limits of Textualism, 48 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1323 (1991).
30. See infra section II.D.
31. See infra section II.B.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 185–87.
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abuse cases.33  If one is committed to youth-centered advocacy—as
contrasted with defense or prosecution-focused advocacy—or takes se-
riously the promotion of a stated legislative aim of protecting child
witnesses while testifying, then there is much to learn from examin-
ing prosecutors’ neglect of this unique aspect of criminal adjudication.
This Article reviews the failure of juvenile shielding statutes to
take hold in the prosecution of cases involving child witnesses because
of prosecutors’ discretionary decisions not to use these statutes.34  The
Article investigates prosecutors’ pragmatic and doctrinal justifications
for not utilizing juvenile shielding statutes and concludes that the
proffered reasons are legitimate.  Building on these insights, the Arti-
cle concludes by offering legislative reform designed to revitalize juve-
nile shielding statutes.
The discussion that follows proceeds in three parts.  Part II de-
scribes the development of juvenile shielding laws, particularly the
circumstances sparking the public and academic demand for protec-
tion of juvenile witnesses during in-court testimony, the resulting
state legislative enactments of juvenile shielding statutes, and the Su-
preme Court’s validation of these statutes in Craig.  This Part then
describes evidence revealing the unexpected failure of prosecutors to
use this modern and constitutional litigation device.
Part III fleshes out the multiple factors that have led prosecutors
to seldom use such statutes, despite expectations to the contrary.
Generally, prosecutors’ concerns reflect four ideas:  namely, that
shielding is (1) infeasible, (2) needless, (3) ineffective, and (4) imper-
missible.  Even in the wake of Craig, a follow-up assessment of each
explanation shows them all to be legitimate.
Part IV draws on the observations in Part III to suggest that legis-
lators must pay close attention to who is granted standing to request
protective measures, who falls within the protected class of witnesses,
and which technologies are best utilized to effectuate shielding.  Eval-
uation of these matters leads to three reform proposals.  First, wit-
nesses must be given authority independent from prosecutors to
request shielding.  Second, the class of witnesses eligible for protection
should not be limited by the witness’s role in the case or the character-
istics of the case or child.  Third, legislative enactments should eschew
reliance on electronic technologies.  In essence, this Article suggests
that legislative adoption of these reforms—and only legislative adop-
33. See infra subsection III.D.2.b.
34. This Article embraces the challenge posed by I. Bennett Capers for legal scholars
to examine how the efficacy of a legislative criminal reform effort is contingent
upon the actions of other criminal justice institutions and players. See I. Bennett
Capers, Crime Legitimacy, Our Criminal Network, and the Wire, 8 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 13–15) (on file with author).
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tion of these reforms—will invigorate shielding laws in a way that
permits them to achieve their original and salutary purposes.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUVENILE SHIELDING LAWS
This Part describes the advent of juvenile shielding laws aimed at
remediating the problems with in-court child witness testimony, in-
cluding traumatization of the child witness and production of unrelia-
ble testimony.  In the 1980s and 1990s, psychologists studied the
effects of testifying in court on child sexual abuse victim-witnesses.35
Their efforts were inspired by the rapid increase in reports of child
sexual abuse and notorious child sexual abuse cases that made their
way into the public consciousness.36  Overall, research demonstrated
that some child sex abuse victim-witnesses who testified at trial were
traumatized by the experience generally and by the defendant’s pres-
ence in particular.37  Moreover, in some cases evidence revealed that
confronting the defendant caused the child’s testimony to be less com-
plete and accurate than it otherwise would have been.38
In response to these findings, legislatures nationwide enacted new
laws, including shielding laws, in an effort to limit the negative im-
pact of the defendant’s presence on testifying child witnesses.39
Shielding measures limit the ability of the child witness to view the
defendant while the child testifies.40  In 1990, the Supreme Court in
Maryland v. Craig sanctioned shielding when it held that the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause was not violated when young child
sex abuse victim-witnesses testified at trial outside the courtroom via
one-way closed-circuit television while the defendant remained in the
courtroom.41 Craig remains good law.  In 1999, however, survey data
revealed that prosecutors rarely invoke shielding statutes, and anec-
dotal evidence suggests that this continues to be the case.42
35. See, e.g., Gail S. Goodman et al., Testifying in Criminal Court: Emotional Effects
on Child Sexual Assault Victims, 57 MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOC’Y FOR RES. IN CHILD
DEV., no. 5, 1992 at 1.
36. See Tonya L. Brito, Paranoid Parents, Phantom Menaces, and the Culture of Fear,
2000 WIS. L. REV. 519, 520–22 (2000).
37. Goodman et al., supra note 35, at 114–21.
38. Id. at 88, 121.
39. See DEBRA WHITCOMB, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD 65 (2d
ed. 1992).
40. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853–55 (1990).
41. Id. at 854–55; see infra section II.C.
42. See Gail Goodman et al., Innovations for Child Witnesses: A National Survey, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 255 (1999); infra Part III.
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A. Child Sexual Abuse Reporting, Notoriety, and Research
Beginning in the mid-1970s and continuing through the mid-
1980s, reports of child sexual abuse swiftly increased.43  Then, in the
1980s, the nation’s attention was gripped by a series of criminal sex-
ual abuse prosecutions charging daycare operators with the abuse of
large numbers of young children.44  Daycare employees across the
country were prosecuted and the national media reported on the
cases, including the following:  McMartin Preschool (California), Wee
Care Nursery School (New Jersey), Gingerbread Preschool (Massachu-
setts), Craig’s Country Preschool (Maryland), and Country Walk Day-
care (Florida).45  In connection with these prosecutions, many of the
alleged child victims testified in criminal court.46  Many of the trials
resulted in convictions.47
Researchers soon focused attention on examining the experience of
child victims of sexual abuse while testifying.  Professor Gail Good-
man was, and continues to be, the dominant researcher in this area.
In 1992, Goodman and collaborators published a study, begun years
earlier, concluding that some child sexual abuse victim-witnesses
were frightened by the prospect of testifying in criminal court, were
emotionally stressed while testifying, and suffered continuing psycho-
logical harms as a result of the experience.48
43. The currently named American Humane Association (AHA) was responsible for
collecting data on abuse and neglect from 1973 to 1987. See Child Abuse & Neg-
lect Data, AM. HUMANE ASS’N, http://www.americanhumane.org/children/profess
ional-resources/research-evaluation/child-abuse-and-neglect-data.html (last vis-
ited July 11, 2011).  In 1976, according to the AHA, 1,975 cases of child sex abuse
were reported, and in 1986 the number was 132,000.  Brief of Am. Psychological
Ass’n as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 2 n.2, Craig, 497 U.S. 836
(No. 89-478) [hereinafter APA Brief].
44. See Brito, supra note 36, at 520–22.
45. See id. (listing daycare child abuse cases that grabbed nationwide attention);
Mary DeYoung, Two Decades After McMartin: A Follow-up of 22 Convicted Day
Care Employees, 34 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 9 (2007) (reviewing cases of twenty-
two daycare workers who were convicted in daycare ritual abuse cases).  Not all
cases received national attention, however. See DeYoung, supra, at 11.
46. See, e.g., Craig v. State, 544 A.2d 784 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988), rev’d, 497 U.S.
836 (1990) (Craig’s Country Preschool); State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372 (N.J.
1994) (Wee Care); State v. Kelly, 456 S.E.2d 861 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (Little Ras-
cals); PAUL EBERLE & SHIRLEY EBERLE, THE ABUSE OF INNOCENCE: THE MCMAR-
TIN PRESCHOOL TRIAL 51–68, 75–87 (1993) (McMartin Preschool).
47. Defendants in some cases were convicted and served sentences (e.g., Country
Walk), while others were convicted but had their convictions overturned on ap-
peal, resulting in prosecutors dismissing charges (e.g., Wee Care, Craig’s Country
Preschool). See DeYoung, supra note 45, at 11–13.  The McMartin defendants
were acquitted of many charges and the prosecutors ultimately dismissed the re-
maining ones. Id. at 11.
48. Goodman et al., supra note 35, at 114. The study was funded by the National
Institute of Justice. See WHITCOMB, supra note 39, at 27 n.49.
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In anticipation of testifying, some children reported fear at having
to recount their stories in public and in front of the defendants.49
Overall, children who testified experienced social and emotional
repercussions during the pendency of their cases.50  As compared to
children six to eleven years of age, more specifically, children less than
six years of age and older than eleven years demonstrated more be-
havioral problems after testifying.51  Additionally, children who testi-
fied on multiple occasions had more deep-seated problems, as
compared to children who testified one time.52  After testifying, most
children identified facing the defendant as the most frightening aspect
of testifying.53  Female witnesses experienced higher levels of strain
than males.54
Goodman’s data also revealed that testimony provided by child sex
abuse victim-witnesses who confronted their alleged victimizers in the
courtroom was less than ideal.  Children tended to answer more ques-
tions posed by prosecutors than defense attorneys and provided less
detailed responses to defense attorney questions.55  As a child’s fear of
the defendant increased, the child answered fewer of the prosecutor’s
questions.56
B. State Legislatures Spring into Action
In response to research suggesting that testifying in criminal court
for some child sex abuse victim-witnesses was stressful and produced
unhelpful testimony, many state legislatures enacted statutes permit-
ting the use of measures designed to prevent or reduce trauma to chil-
dren who testify in sex abuse cases.57  Shielding was a common
49. Goodman et al., supra note 35, at 121.
50. Id. at 114.
51. Id. at 115.
52. Id. at 117.
53. Id. at 121.
54. Id. at 116.
55. Id. at 88.
56. Id. at 121.
57. For example, a prosecutor could have a supportive adult sit near the child in the
courtroom while testifying in order to comfort the child. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3509(i)
(2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g(b)(2) (West 2009).  Judges could close
courtrooms to public observation to protect children from the embarrassment and
trauma of testifying publicly. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(e); Globe Newspapers Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).  Judges were authorized to control the man-
ner of interrogation of child witnesses. E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-1 (1995) (permit-
ting leading questions for victims or witnesses under ten years of age).  Some
statutes permit attorneys to use testimonial aides, such as dolls and drawings,
while questioning child witnesses. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3509(l) (“anatomical dolls,
puppets, drawings, mannequins, or any other [appropriate] demonstrative de-
vice”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g(b)(3) (anatomically correct dolls).  Finally,
attorneys have been ordered to remain seated while questioning and making ob-
jections to the testimony of child witnesses. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-
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innovation.  By December 31, 1989, thirty-two states and the federal
government had passed statutes allowing for juvenile shielding by
closed-circuit television.58
The closed-circuit television method involves taking the child’s tes-
timony in a location outside the courtroom, while contemporaneously
transmitting it into the courtroom via closed-circuit television.59  In
all cases, the defendant remains in the courtroom and can view the
testifying child.60  Sometimes, testimony taking involves only one-way
transmission, so that the child witness does not view the defendant at
all.61  Other times a judge uses two-way transmission, which permits
the child to view the defendant through a video monitor without hav-
ing to enter the courtroom and testify in the physical presence of the
defendant.62
Shielding can also be implemented without the use of electronic
technology.  Prior to the enactment of shielding statutes, some judges
authorized the placement of a one-way screen, partition, or mirror be-
tween the child and the defendant so that the child could not observe
the defendant but the jury and defendant were able to observe the
child.63  Other judges reconfigured the parties’ or witnesses’ stations
in the courtroom to allow the defendant and jury to see the child wit-
ness while limiting the ability of the juvenile to see the defendant.64
86g(b)(4); see also Montoya, supra note 20, at 1260–61 (discussing different statu-
tory schemes enacted to protect child witnesses).
58. WHITCOMB, supra note 39, at 65.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Weekley, 130 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 1997) (using two-way
closed-circuit television); United States v. Quintero, 21 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1994)
(using closed-circuit television); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir.
1993) (using two-way closed-circuit television).
60. Shielding as used herein does not include use of closed-circuit television to trans-
mit a child’s testimony from one room to the courtroom when the defendant is
present in the same room while the child is testifying because the child testifies
in the defendant’s physical presence.
61. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 841–42 (1990).
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1); United States v. Boyles, 57 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 1995).
Another method relying on electronics is to video-record the child’s testimony
outside the defendant’s presence prior to trial and later show the recorded testi-
mony in the courtroom during trial.  This method combines both shielding and
use of the child’s hearsay testimony.  This Article does not concern the use of
hearsay testimony in lieu of in-court testimony. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.
346 (1992); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
63. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (2011) (permitting one-way mirror); Hover-
sten v. Iowa, 998 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); Graham v. Addison, No. CIV-
05-322-RAW, 2008 WL 2704474 (E.D. Okla. July 7, 2008) (using a blackboard as a
divider).
64. E.g., Ellis v. United States, 313 F.3d 636 (1st Cir. 2002) (positioning witness’s
chair so that it did not face the defendant); Smith v. State, 8 S.W.3d 534 (Ark.
2000) (same); Ortiz v. State, 374 S.E.2d 92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (same); State v.
Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (switching usual prosecution and de-
fense seating arrangement so that witness was not seated directly across from
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C. Supreme Court Approval
Shielding statutes proved controversial because they implicate the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, which specifies: “In all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.”65  The Supreme Court had long sug-
gested that confrontation requires physical proximity of the defendant
and witness while the witness testifies.  In an 1895 case, Mattox v.
United States,66 the Court stated that a witness should “stand face to
face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives testimony
whether he is worthy of belief.”67  Eighty-five years later, in Ohio v.
Roberts,68 the Court again declared that “the Confrontation Clause re-
flects a preference for face-to-face confrontation.”69  Criminal defend-
ants drew on these authorities to argue that shielding laws offended
the textual command of the Constitution that they be “confronted with
the witnesses against” them.70
Notwithstanding defendants’ arguments, in Coy v. Iowa71 the
Court signaled its willingness to uphold child shielding laws.  In Coy,
the defendant was charged with sexual abuse of two thirteen-year-old
girls.72  At the State’s request, the trial court permitted the two vic-
tim-witnesses to testify at the defendant’s trial behind a one-way
screen that shielded the defendant from the witnesses’ views.73  Fol-
defendant). But see Commonwealth v. Johnson, 631 N.E.2d 1002 (Mass. 1994)
(placing child so the defendant observed only the child’s back held
unconstitutional).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The Supreme Court has held that the right of confronta-
tion applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 56
(1967).  It is unclear, however, whether the nature, scope, and application of the
right of confrontation in juvenile proceedings are identical to that in adult crimi-
nal prosecutions.
66. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
67. Id. at 242–43.
68. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
69. Id. at 63. But see Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (claiming “the Confron-
tation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses ap-
pearing before the trier of fact” (emphasis added)).  Some state constitutions use
“face-to-face” language in their confrontation clauses. E.g., KY. CONST. § 11 (“In
all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right to . . . meet the witnesses face
to face”); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII (“[E]very subject shall have a right to . . .
meet the witnesses against him face to face”); see also Sarah M. Dunn, Note,
“Face to Face” with the Right of Confrontation: A Critique of the Supreme Court of
Kentucky’s Approach to the Confrontation Clause of the Kentucky Constitution, 96
KY. L.J. 301, 314 n.22 (2008) (listing states with “face-to-face” confrontation
clause language).  These states vary in whether or not the use of “face-to-face”
language requires physical confrontation. See Dunn, supra, at 316–18.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
71. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
72. Id. at 1012.
73. Id. at 1014–15.
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lowing conviction, the defendant appealed, contending that use of the
screen violated his right to face-to-face confrontation.74  The Iowa Su-
preme Court affirmed his conviction.75
Before the Supreme Court, the State claimed that the defendant’s
Sixth Amendment confrontation right should be subordinated to the
“necessity of protecting victims of sexual abuse.”76  The Supreme
Court overturned the defendant’s conviction, but did so on narrow
grounds.  The trial court had not made individualized findings that
the victim-witnesses would be traumatized because the Iowa statute
authorizing shielding created a presumption of witness trauma.77
Citing a lack of individualized findings of trauma, the Supreme Court
held that the defendant’s right of confrontation was violated and re-
versed and remanded.78  The Court declined to reach the question of
whether there were any exceptions to a defendant’s face-to-face Con-
frontation Clause right, leaving open the possibility of permitting
shielded testimony if individualized trauma appeared on the record.79
Less than two years after its decision in Coy, the Supreme Court in
Maryland v. Craig80 again encountered the shielding issue.  In Craig,
the government had charged a daycare owner with committing sexual
offenses against a six-year-old girl attending the daycare.81  At trial,
the State invoked a Maryland statute permitting a child victim-wit-
ness to testify via one-way closed-circuit television in a room apart
from the courtroom where the defendant remained.82  Before a child
could testify in this manner, the statute required an individualized
finding that the child would suffer serious emotional distress prevent-
ing reasonable communication in court.83  The defendant objected to
the protective measure, citing her face-to-face Confrontation Clause
right.84  The trial court rejected her argument and permitted the vic-
tim and three other children to testify via the protective procedure.85
74. Id. at 1015.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1020.
77. Id. at 1021.
78. Id. at 1021–22.
79. Id. at 1021. The Court stated, however, that were it in the future to find any
exceptions to the right of confrontation, it would do so only to “further an impor-
tant public policy.” Id.  Justice O’Connor wrote separately for herself and Justice
White to make clear their viewpoint that Confrontation Clause rights are not
absolute and “may give way in an appropriate case to other competing interests.”
Id. at 1022 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  These Justices deemed the protection of
child witnesses a “compelling state interest.” Id. at 1025.
80. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
81. Id. at 840.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 841.
84. Id. at 842.
85. Id. at 843.  A fifth child, aged eight years, also testified but did so without being
shielded.  Brief for Petitioner at 11 n.13, Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (No. 89-478).  Be-
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The jury convicted the defendant of all counts.86  Her conviction was
reversed on appeal for an insufficient showing of witness trauma.87
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve “whether the Con-
frontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment categorically prohibits a
child witness in a child abuse case from testifying against a defendant
at trial, outside the defendant’s physical presence, by one-way closed
circuit television.”88  Before turning directly to the issue, the Court
delineated the nature and bounds of the Confrontation Clause right,
stating, as it had in the past, that a witness ordinarily must testify in
the defendant’s physical presence.89  The Court went on to conclude,
however, that in “narrow circumstances” competing interests “ ‘may
warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial.’ ”90  The Court ex-
plained that these “narrow circumstances” would exist only when dis-
pensing with face-to-face confrontation was “necessary to further an
important public policy and . . . reliability of the testimony [was] oth-
erwise assured.”91
Turning to the propriety of the statutory procedure at issue, the
Court had no difficulty recognizing as compelling the State’s interest
in protecting minor victims of sex crimes from additional trauma and
embarrassment.92  The Court further concluded that “a State’s inter-
est in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims
cause she did not claim to have been abused, she was not covered by the authoriz-
ing statute. Id.
86. Craig, 497 U.S. at 843.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 840.
89. Id. at 844.  Writing for the majority in Coy, Justice Scalia employed history and
precedent to argue that the right of confrontation requires a witness and defen-
dant come face-to-face; that is, the witness must testify in the physical proximity
of the defendant.  Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015–21 (1988).  The Court clearly
stated, however, that the confrontation right does not require eyeball-to-eyeball
confrontation such that a witness must look at the defendant or in the defen-
dant’s eyes while testifying. Id. at 1019.  Moreover, courts have not interpreted
state constitutions employing the “face-to-face” language as requiring eyeball-to-
eyeball confrontation. See Dunn, supra note 69, at 314 n.22 (citing state court
decisions that reject eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation).  A trier-of-fact may, how-
ever, draw whatever inferences it likes from the failure of a witness to look the
defendant in the eye. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019.
90. Craig, 497 U.S. at 848 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980)).
91. Id. at 850.  It is unclear whether and how Craig applies to juvenile delinquency
proceedings.  Pursuant to authorizing statutes, courts have permitted shielding
in juvenile delinquency matters. E.g., In re J.D.S., 436 N.W.2d 342 (Iowa 1989)
(four-year-old allegedly abused by sixteen-year-old testified via one-way mirror);
In re Noel O., 855 N.Y.S.2d 318 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2008) (allowing five-year-old al-
leged victim of sexual abuse by teen to testify via two-way closed-circuit televi-
sion); In re Howard, 694 N.E.2d 488 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (permitting child
victims and witnesses of sexual abuse allegedly committed by a fifteen-year-old to
testify via two-way closed-circuit television).
92. Craig, 497 U.S. at 852.
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may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some instances,
a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in court.”93
Following the logic of Coy, however, the Court continued to insist
that shielding is permissible only “if the State makes an adequate
showing of necessity.”94  Moreover, a determination of necessity must
be on a case-by-case basis, be individualized to the particular child
witness, be grounded on something more than de minimis trauma,
and be attributable to the presence of the defendant rather than the
other stresses of in-court testimony.95  Because the court below had
not made such an inquiry, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded
the case for further findings.96
D. Unanticipated Prosecutorial Neglect
One might reasonably expect that shielding would be a popular lit-
igation tool in the arsenal of prosecutors, especially given the public
concern for child abuse victims, social science supporting the use of
shielding, and constitutional approval of shielding laws.97  In a follow-
up study, however, Gail Goodman discovered otherwise.98  In 1999,
Goodman examined prosecutorial utilization of shielding mecha-
nisms.99  Her research revealed that prosecutors rarely utilized
shielding, primarily because the court would not permit them to do so
or because they anticipated they would not be authorized to utilize
shielding if requested.100  Goodman’s study was far-reaching.  It sur-
veyed prosecutors nationwide about their use of shielding techniques
and other innovations for child witnesses, their perceptions of those
new methods, and prosecutors’ reasons for not using particular inno-
vations.101  Goodman also solicited information regarding the impact
of Craig on prosecutorial use of protective measures for child
witnesses.102
As with many studies, Goodman’s work may not capture the reali-
ties of shielding in perfect fashion.  Goodman noted several limitations
93. Id. at 853.
94. Id. at 855.
95. Id. at 855–56.
96. Id. at 860.  On remand, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the trial court
failed to make findings necessary to allow shielding, resulting in the reversal of
the conviction.  Craig v. Maryland, 588 A.2d 328, 340 (Md. 1991).  Eventually, the
government declined to re-try the case. See Elisha King, State Won’t Seek to Re-
try Howard Child-Abuse Case, BALT. SUN, July 2, 1991, available at 1991 WLNR
767058.
97. See supra sections II.A–C.
98. See Goodman et al., supra note 42, at 255.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 270.
101. Id. at 263.
102. Id.
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of the study, including a less than ideal fifty-two percent return rate
among those surveyed, the temporal limitation of the results to the
early 1990s, and the inability to draw causal relations from the
data.103  Nevertheless, the study offers helpful insights about
prosecutorial decision-making.  Prosecutors—not judges, child-wit-
nesses, or parents—are the primary end-users of child witness legisla-
tive innovations because they are usually responsible for making
strategic decisions regarding litigation, including whether to seek ap-
proval to use shielding.104  As a result, prosecutors’ motivations and
desires should play a key role in legislative design.  If prosecutors do
not ultimately utilize the statutes, then the aims of legislators will be
frustrated.
As an initial matter, Goodman’s survey queried the characteristics
of cases in which children appeared as witnesses.105  According to
prosecutors, the most common cases of this sort involved prosecutions
for child sexual abuse, physical abuse, and domestic violence.106  In
the child sexual abuse cases, the children were especially likely to
have been the victims of the prosecuted crimes.107
Next, Goodman asked about the level of utilization of child witness
accommodations in child sexual abuse cases, as well as prosecutor per-
ceptions of particular accommodations and explanations for lack of
use.108  In response to these questions, prosecutors indicated that they
rarely or never used shielding measures.109  With respect to inquiry
regarding the utility of shielding, a high percentage of prosecutors did
not respond, suggesting that their lack of experiences with shielding
prevented them from judging its utility.110  Those who did address the
utility of shielding measures rated shielding as only moderately useful
103. Id. at 277–78.
104. Shielding statutes fall into one of four categories with respect to standing: (1)
those that generally grant courts authority to order shielding, without specifying
whether a motion must be filed and by whom, e.g., MD. CODE  ANN., CRIM. PROC.
§ 11-303(b) (West, Westlaw through 2011 legislation); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-
120(a) (2000); (2) those that vest authority to request standing in parties, pre-
sumably prosecutors and defendants, but not the witness, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-86g(a) (West 2009); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 329A (2004); (3) those
that vest standing in parties, the child, and the court, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3509
(2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405(2) (West 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-
32.4(c) (West 1994); and, perhaps the most rare, (4) those that vest standing
solely in prosecutors, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b) (West 2004).
105. Goodman et al., supra note 42, at 255.
106. Id. at 264–65.
107. Id. at 277.
108. Id. at 267–73.
109. Id. at 267.  Prosecutors were most likely to use vertical prosecution, preparation
of testimony, support persons in the courtroom, and tours of the courtroom in
child sexual abuse cases to accommodate child witnesses. Id.
110. Id. at 270.
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in reducing trauma to the testifying child and increasing the chances
of successful prosecution.111
Goodman specifically asked prosecutors why they did not utilize
shielding.112  Prosecutors responded that the primary reason for not
using shielding measures was that the court would not grant permis-
sion.113  Concern that defendants would challenge the measure was
also commonly cited as a reason not to pursue shielding.114  With re-
spect to shielding by closed-circuit television, prosecutors additionally
cited a lack of funding.115
Finally, Goodman sought to determine whether the Supreme
Court’s holding in Craig influenced prosecutorial decisions about us-
ing child witness accommodations.116  Only nine out of 134 respon-
dents indicated that Craig influenced their litigation practices.117  Of
those respondents, only three indicated that it encouraged them to use
shielding methods.118
In sum, Goodman’s study revealed that children are especially
likely to testify as victims in child sex abuse cases.119  Additionally,
she learned that children who testify usually do so without the benefit
of shielding.120  Finally, prosecutors explained that the Supreme
Court’s approval of shielding did not influence prosecutors to seek its
use, and the most common reasons for not shielding included lack of
permission, fear of defense challenges, and lack of resources.121  The
next Part explores these explanations in greater detail and examines
others in order to ascertain whether prosecutors’ explanations are
well-founded.
III. AN AUTOPSY OF JUVENILE SHIELDING LAWS
Juvenile shielding statutes reflect legislative efforts to decrease
the psychological harms to children that result from testifying in the
presence of defendants and to increase the quality and quantity of
such testimony.122  Because prosecutors and judges had earlier ac-
knowledged the utility of shielding a juvenile witness from the defen-
111. Id. at 269.  Victim advocates, support persons in the courtroom, and touring the
courtroom were deemed useful for reducing trauma to child witnesses in child sex
abuse cases but not for increasing guilty outcomes. Id. at 268–69.
112. Id. at 263.
113. Id. at 269.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 273.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 264–65.
120. Id. at 268.
121. Id. at 270–73.
122. E.g., id. at 256.
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dant’s presence, even without legislative approval,123 observers might
rightly have expected that prosecutors would embrace the formalized
endorsement of shielding and use it broadly in their efforts to prose-
cute defendants in child abuse cases.  Yet, Goodman’s nationwide sur-
vey of prosecutors revealed that prosecutors rarely use shielding
measures.124  Prosecutors indicated that they do not use shielding be-
cause they view it as infeasible, needless, ineffective, and impermissi-
ble.125  This Part probes the legitimacy of each of those explanations.
A. Infeasibility
Pragmatic concerns about implementation costs affect whether
prosecutors use shielding, particularly technology-based shielding.  In
response to Goodman’s 1999 survey, prosecutors indicated that they
chose to rely mostly on child witness accommodations that were easily
and inexpensively implemented, such as touring the courtroom with
the child prior to trial or having a supportive adult in the courtroom
while the child testified.126  Prosecutors were less likely to use techno-
logical innovations—such as closed-circuit television—that require ex-
pensive machinery and out-of-the-ordinary efforts to implement, such
as the purchasing of video and audio equipment, acquiring additional
space, and employing specially trained personnel.127  More recent in-
formation confirms that cost-based concerns continue to hamper the
use of modern shielding technologies.  In 2004, prosecutors were ad-
vised that technology-based shielding can be “very expensive” and
“may be cost prohibitive.”128
B. Needlessness
Goodman’s survey of prosecutors identified lack of need as a reason
prosecutors do not use juvenile shielding.129  The survey data indi-
cated that lack of need justifications flow from either the overall case
mix of the prosecutor’s office or the case-specific evaluation of a partic-
ular prosecutor.130
In a variety of ways, the particular caseload of an office or jurisdic-
tion may impact the frequency with which prosecutors need to use
shielding measures.  Some jurisdictions handle only a small number of
123. See supra section II.B.
124. See supra section II.D.
125. See infra sections III.A–D.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 108–15.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 108–15.
128. AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., supra note 18, at 455 (listing the disadvan-
tages of using closed-circuit television).
129. Goodman et al., supra note 42, at 270.
130. Id. at 267.
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cases involving child witnesses.131  The dearth of cases in an office
may be attributable either to a lack of cases coming to the attention of
prosecutors or an office’s low prioritization of cases with child wit-
nesses, particularly child victim-witnesses.132  In offices with few
cases involving child witnesses, it is not surprising that prosecutors
would less frequently use shielding.133  Fewer cases creates fewer op-
portunities or need to use shielding, as well as greater per case cost to
put technology to work.134  Relatedly, it stands to reason that offices
that do not—for whatever reason—prioritize cases involving child wit-
nesses, particularly child victim-witnesses, would choose not to devote
significant resources and energies to these prosecutions.135  This is
not to suggest that the office would not vigorously pursue prosecution.
The office, however, may not go out of its way to utilize measures that
are costly, preferring to focus resources on prioritized cases and use
methods that are less resource-intensive.136  Another caseload consid-
eration turns on rates of guilty pleas.  In jurisdictions with high guilty
plea rates, it would be expected that shielding measures are rarely
utilized for the simple reason that shielding becomes an issue only in
cases that go to trial.  If a prosecutor is able to resolve a case with a
guilty plea and avoid going to trial, then the need to use shielding
measures at trial is eliminated.137
Case-specific reasons also lend prosecutors to perceive a lack of
need to use shielding.  Prosecutors may decide not to seek the use of
shielding if they are of the opinion, personally or after consultation
with others, that the measure is not needed for a particular child.138
The prosecutor may conclude that a child witness faces little or no risk
of trauma from testifying that is attributable to a face-to-face encoun-
ter with the defendant.139  In other words, an evaluation of this kind
may lead the prosecutor to conclude that shielding is not necessary for
the child because the child will not be harmed by testifying in the de-
fendant’s presence.
C. Ineffectiveness
Prosecutors’ responses to Goodman’s survey suggest that they are
not confident in the efficacy of shielding and that they are unwilling to
131. See id. at 266–67.
132. Id. at 267.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 274.
135. Id. at 267.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 270–71 tbl.5; see also AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., supra note 18, at
455 (“[P]rosecutor must determine whether close circuit television is appropriate
on a case-by-case basis.”).
139. See AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., supra note 18, at 455.
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use unhelpful innovations they believe will undermine the chances of
conviction.140  Shielding laws are aimed at both reducing the stress
placed on child witnesses from testifying in the defendant’s presence
and facilitating prosecution by promoting the receipt of testimony
from children.141  Apparently, prosecutors are not inclined to believe
that shielding statutes achieve these goals.  In response to Goodman’s
survey, prosecutors responded that shielding is “useful” at reducing
children’s stress, but not “very useful.”142  Prosecutors’ perceptions re-
specting whether shielding increases the likelihood of conviction were
less optimistic.  With respect to this concern, prosecutors rated shield-
ing between “rarely useful” and “useful.”143  Prosecutors were also
concerned the use of shielding might lead to a successful defense
appeal.144
D. Impermissibility
In response to Goodman’s survey, prosecutors indicated that the
primary reason for not using shielding is that courts rejected their re-
quests.145  Given the Supreme Court’s ruling in Craig, this response
may seem odd or mistaken.  Close examination suggests, however,
that the response makes some sense.  Prosecutors, not surprisingly,
are hesitant to pursue litigation strategies that pose a chance of re-
sulting in the reversal of a conviction.  Indeed, prosecutors are em-
ployed to pursue punishment for criminal violations and, like other
trial lawyers, tend to measure success based on case outcomes.  In the
case of child witness testimony, Goodman’s survey revealed that pros-
ecutors would strategically decline to use innovations that had the po-
tential to hurt their cases, even if the measures might benefit the
children.146  For prosecutors, the post-Craig legal landscape may not
have instilled confidence that shielding approvals by trial judges can
be either affirmed or successfully defended on appeal.  Three main
concerns propel prosecutorial worries.  First, in some jurisdictions,
complications exist due to state constitutional rules that may impose
limitations in addition to the federal law standards delineated in
Craig.147  Second, Craig itself raises far-reaching questions of applica-
bility due to the opaqueness of the Craig rationale, the inherent diffi-
culties of applying Craig’s rationale anew to individual cases, and
legal uncertainties that surrounded the Court’s endorsement of
140. See Goodman et al., supra note 42, at 267–74.
141. Id. at 256.
142. Id. at 268.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 272.
145. Id. at 270, 272.
146. Id. at 272.
147. See infra subsection III.D.1.
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shielding in some circumstances.148  Finally, the Supreme Court has
not clarified or refined Craig, despite opportunities to do so.149
1. Interference of State Constitutional Laws
In Craig, the Supreme Court held that shielding statutes did not
violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.150  After Craig,
however, state courts remained free to evaluate shielding statutes in
light of their own state constitutions.151  Most state courts held that
shielding statutes withstood scrutiny under state constitutions.152
However, relying on state constitutional language requiring “face-to-
face” confrontation, three states interpreted their respective state con-
stitutions as requiring literal face-to-face confrontation, which does
not occur when shielding is employed.153  Thus, for some prosecutors,
shielding is not constitutionally available despite state legislative ap-
proval and Supreme Court sanction.
State constitutions also raise complications to the use of shielding
laws even when state-court rulings have not wholly barred their use.
First, in some jurisdictions it remains unresolved whether shielding
comports with state constitutional commands.154  In any such state,
prosecutors may utilize shielding only at their own peril.  Second, even
if state courts conclude that state constitutions authorize shielding,
they may not permit its use to the same extent as Craig.155  At least in
some states, defendants may be able to urge courts that a shielding
ruling that meets the Craig standard offends a stricter standard es-
tablished by state law.156  Again, this state of affairs creates legal per-
ils for prosecutors; faced with this two-bites-at-the-apple problem,
local prosecutors might choose to avoid the use of shielding altogether.
2. Concerns about Craig
Even if a jurisdiction’s shielding statute survives state constitu-
tional scrutiny, concern about the rationale underlying the Craig stan-
dard and a plethora of unresolved issues about that standard’s
meaning may well discourage prosecutors from attempting to use the
shielding mechanism.
148. See infra subsection III.D.2.
149. See infra subsection III.D.3.
150. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857 (1990).
151. See Dunn, supra note 69, at 311–14.
152. See id. at 316–17.
153. See People v. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d 685 (Ill. 1994); Commonwealth v. Berg-
strom, 524 N.E.2d 366 (Mass. 1988); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 594 A.2d 281
(Pa. 1991).
154. See Dunn, supra note 69, at 317.
155. See id.
156. See, e.g., Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981, 986–89 (Ind. 1991).
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i. Nebulous Rationale
The rationale for the Court’s holding in Craig is indefinite.  On one
hand, the Court’s rationale seems to be grounded in long-standing pre-
cedent focused on promoting child welfare.157  A holding grounded in
precedent stands on sure footing and is unlikely to be overturned.  On
the other hand, the Court’s decision can be viewed as rooted in over-
whelming state legislative support of shielding measures and empiri-
cal findings that correlated in-court testimony with psychological
harms.158  A decision premised on such contemporary representations
of public values, both of which can shift over time, seems more unsta-
ble in nature.  These complexities in the Court’s underlying reasoning
in Craig raise questions as to both the durability and scope of the
holding.
In arriving at its holding in Craig, the Court cited precedent estab-
lishing that the need to protect children suffices to warrant interfer-
ence with a constitutional right.159  Of particular significance were
New York v. Ferber160 and Osborne v. Ohio,161 both of which the Court
acknowledged approved legislation intruding on constitutional rights
in order to further the State’s interest in protecting the physical and
emotional welfare of children.162  The Court in Ferber confronted the
question of whether a New York criminal statute that prohibited “per-
sons from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children
under the age of 16 by distributing material which depicts such per-
formances” violated the First Amendment.163  In Osborne, decided in
the same term as Craig, the Court considered “whether Ohio may con-
stitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of child pornogra-
phy” in light of the First Amendment.164  In both cases, the Court
rejected the constitutional attack.165  Furthermore, the Craig Court
relied upon Ginsberg v. New York166 for the proposition that the
State’s interest in protecting child welfare is “traditional and ‘tran-
scendent.’”167 Ginsberg held that a prohibition on the sale of obscen-
ity to minors was constitutional when obscenity was determined in
reference to minors and not adults.168  Finally, the Court favorably
157. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852–53 (1990).
158. See id. at 853–55.
159. Id. at 852–53.
160. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
161. 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
162. Craig, 497 U.S. at 852–53.
163. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749.
164. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108.
165. See id.; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 774.
166. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
167. Craig, 497 U.S. at 855 (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640).
168. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 633.
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cited Prince v. Massachusetts,169 in which the Court upheld child la-
bor laws on the basis of the State’s parens patriae interest in the well-
being of its youth.170
Having indicated that its precedent established a compelling state
interest in protecting child victims of sex abuse, the Court went on to
explain that its conclusion was reinforced by the substantial legisla-
tive support for measures aimed at reducing the trauma to child wit-
nesses in abuse cases.171  More particularly, the Court tallied the
number of states that permitted use of either one-way or two-way
closed-circuit television in abuse cases as well as those authorizing
videotaped testimony of sexually abused witnesses.172  The Court has
often relied upon patterns of state legislative activity to justify consti-
tutional decisions, but such reliance is not without its concerns and
criticisms.173  Moreover, it is unclear to what extent the Court relied
on the modern legislative trend to support its decision.
These difficulties in determining the rationale for the Court’s rul-
ing are compounded because the Supreme Court’s decision may also
be viewed as grounded in whole or in part on social science data.174  In
the 1980s, social scientists studied the effects of testifying on child sex
abuse victim-witnesses and concluded that some child sex abuse vic-
tims are significantly harmed by testifying in the defendant’s presence
and unreliable testimony may result from the defendant’s presence
while the witness testifies.175  Legislatures enacted shielding provi-
sions in response to this research.176
The Supreme Court was aware of the existing social science data
when it issued its decision in Craig, in part because the American Psy-
chological Association filed an amicus brief relating the state of knowl-
edge at the time of the case.177  Goodman was a primary consultant on
the brief and her research permeates its arguments.178  In its deci-
sion, the Court pointed out that social science evidence supported
shielding.179  In keeping with the findings of Goodman, the Court also
spoke at various times of protecting the physical and psychological
169. 321 U.S. 158 (1944); see Craig, 497 U.S. at 852.
170. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166–70.
171. Craig, 497 U.S. at 853.
172. Id. at 853–54 & nn.2–4.
173. See, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,”
57 UCLA L. REV. 365, 369–70 (2009) (concluding that the Court’s reliance on the
majority trends of states to decide constitutional questions challenges the tradi-
tional understanding of the Court as counter-majoritarian and “bedrock princi-
ples of constitutional law”).
174. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 854–55.
175. See supra section II.A.
176. See supra section II.B.
177. See APA Brief, supra note 43.
178. See id.
179. Craig, 497 U.S. at 855.
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well-being of child abuse victims, as well as protecting minor victims
of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment.180
The Court’s references to social science evidence were arguably de-
signed to lend strength to the Court’s ultimate approval of shielding,
whether based on precedent or legislative trend, rather than serve as
the primary justification for permitting shielding.181  Yet, it is possi-
ble that neither legislatures nor the Supreme Court were cautious
enough in relying on social science to support adoption and approval of
shielding.  The state of research at the time was not robust and, de-
pending on one’s assessment, either did not demonstrate a consensus
viewpoint or was conflicted.182  The question naturally arises then: If
premised on social science, should the Court’s approval of shielding
retain vitality if the initial data is discredited or newer data under-
mines it?
ii. Multiple Open Questions
Wholly apart from uncertainties about Craig’s underlying ratio-
nale, the Court’s decision left many questions unresolved, thereby cre-
ating unpredictability that has led prosecutors to avoid the use of
shielding in some cases.  Open questions include: How much more
than de minimis trauma must be shown to warrant shielding?  Is
shielding permissible for children who are traumatized but neverthe-
less can testify?  Must expert testimony be presented to establish the
necessity for shielding?  And what standard of proof applies when a
trial court evaluates a case?  Scholars have attempted to address these
questions.183
A particularly difficult issue, which may substantially undermine
prosecutorial utilization of shielding, is whether the Court’s decision
in Craig is generalizable to all juvenile witnesses in any type of case or
is limited only to specific categories of child witnesses, such as to very
young child victims in sex abuse cases like those involved in Craig
itself.  Scholars have paid far less attention to exploring in depth this
issue.184
180. Id. at 852–53.
181. See id. at 852–54.
182. See, e.g., APA Brief, supra note 43.
183. See sources cited supra note 29.
184. Some have briefly raised the proposition. E.g., Amy Ljungdahl, Maryland v.
Craig: Public Policy Trumps Constitutional Guarantees, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 515, 521 (2004) (querying whether the protections of Craig are limited to
child sex abuse victims or extend to adult victims and victims of other crimes);
Marc Chase McAllister, Two-Way Video Trial Testimony and the Confrontation
Clause: Fashioning a Better Craig Test in Light of Crawford, 34 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 835, 854–55 (2007) (opining that Craig should extend to disguised adult wit-
nesses among others); Wendel, supra note 29, at 490 (“It is difficult to see . . . how
the state’s interest in protecting the well-being of children who are the victims of
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB203.txt unknown Seq: 24 29-NOV-11 14:14
364 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:341
Some state legislatures passed statutes that allow shielding only of
certain classes of child witnesses.  For example, shielding statutes
vary widely in their age cut-offs.185  With respect to the nature of the
case, rules differ on whether to allow shielding in a narrow category of
cases, a modest range of cases, or broadly in any case.186  Finally,
child abuse differs that much from (1) the state’s interest in the well-being of
children who are the victims of other personal crimes of a heinous nature; and (2)
the state’s interest in the well-being of victims of heinous crimes, regardless of
the age of the victim.”).  Others have argued for extension of Craig to select cate-
gories of adults. E.g., J. Steven Beckett & Steven D. Stennett, The Elder Wit-
ness—The Admissibility of Closed Circuit Television Testimony After Maryland v.
Craig, 7 ELDER L.J. 313 (1999); Thekla Hansen-Young, Considering the Constitu-
tionality of a Confrontation Clause Exception for Domestic Violence Victims, 14
BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 82 (2006); Heather Fleniken Cochran, Note, Improving Pros-
ecution of Battering Partners: Some Innovations in the Law of Evidence, 7 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 89, 112–13 (1997); Lisa Hamilton Thielmeyer, Note, Beyond Mary-
land v. Craig: Can and Should Adult Rape Victims be Permitted to Testify by
Closed-Circuit Television?, 67 IND. L.J. 797 (1992).
185. A small minority of jurisdictions permits all juveniles up to the age of eighteen to
be shielded.  The Maryland statute at issue in Craig applied to juveniles under
the age of eighteen years who were victims of child abuse. Craig, 497 U.S. at 842.
That statute remains in effect but is now codified elsewhere. See MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-303 (West, Westlaw through 2011 legislation).  The fed-
eral shielding statute that was enacted five months after the Court’s decision in
Craig also allows shielding for juveniles up to the age of eighteen years.  Victims
of Child Abuse Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 225(a), 104 Stat. 4792, 4798
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2006)).  Iowa and Hawaii also set the
maximum age at eighteen years. IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.38 (West 2003); HAW. R.
EVID. 616.  Several states also extend shielding to older teenagers, though not up
to eighteen years of age.  Louisiana and Rhode Island set the limit for shielding
at seventeen years of age.  LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 329 (Supp. I 2010); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (2002).  A handful of states set the limit at sixteen years
of age. ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (LexisNexis 1995); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (2004);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405 (West 1999);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (West 1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5982,
5985 (West 2000).  On the lower end of the age spectrum, many states permit
shielding only for children who have not yet reached their teen years—for exam-
ple, Delaware sets its age limit at eleven years.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3514
(2001).  Many other jurisdictions set the limit only slightly later at twelve years.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-43-1001 (1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-10-402 (2010); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (West
2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460(24)
(2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-30 (2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 972.11(2m)
(West 2007); VT. R. EVID. 807.  Georgia and Washington are the most restrictive
respecting age, setting the limit at ten years. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (2004);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.150 (West 2009).
186. Consistent with the fact that shielding was created in response to the experiences
of child sex abuse victims, some jurisdictions have limited shielding to child sex
abuse cases. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (2002) (limiting shielding to child
sex abuse victims seventeen-years-old or younger).  Commonly, however, statutes
have moved a step further and extended shielding to all child abuse cases,
whether sexual or physical. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West 2009);
LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 329 (Supp. I 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.150
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB203.txt unknown Seq: 25 29-NOV-11 14:14
2011] PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 365
some jurisdictions limit the availability of shielding based on the
child’s relationship to the case.187  Thus, in these jurisdictions, prose-
cutors may not be allowed to use shielding at all because of statutory
limitations, even though the federal Constitution otherwise permits it.
In other instances, a prosecutor may avoid the use of shielding laws
due to potential disputes over ambiguous statutory interpretations re-
garding eligibility.188  Given the lack of clarity of Craig, even prosecu-
tors in jurisdictions with broad eligibility rules might hesitate to
argue for shielding of a large portion of juvenile witnesses, including
adolescent victims of prostitution or child witnesses to domestic
violence.
When it decided Craig, the Supreme Court was well aware of dif-
fering statutory treatments of shielding.  At oral arguments in both
Coy and Craig, the Court inquired of counsel for the States about the
limitations on what types of witnesses and in what types of cases the
protective measures could be implemented.  In Coy, the Court in-
quired specifically about the limitations of the Iowa statute that au-
thorized the use of the screen.189  Counsel contended that the
language of the statute made the screening protection applicable even
to a child witness in a robbery case where the child witnessed only a
portion of the crime.190  Upon further questioning about the broader
applicability of his argument, counsel also maintained that, like trau-
matized children, traumatized adults and the elderly should be able to
(West 2009).  Some states have expanded shielding to all violent crime cases.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West 2004) (violent felonies); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 595.02(4) (West 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.481 (LexisNexis 2003);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-30 (2004).  At the extreme are jurisdictions that per-
mit shielding of a child in any criminal case. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-43-1001
(1999); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985 (West 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 972.11(2m) (West 2007).
187. Maryland’s shielding statute, which was at issue in Craig, limits shielding to vic-
tims.  MD. CODE  ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-303 (West, Westlaw through 2011 legis-
lation); Craig, 497 U.S. at 842.  Many other jurisdictions similarly limit shielding.
E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (2004); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-3434 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.481 (LexisNexis 2003);
HAW. R. EVID. 616.  Other jurisdictions, however, allow for both victims and wit-
nesses to be shielded. E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (LexisNexis 1995); ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.45.046 (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4251 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-10-402 (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3514 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54
(West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (LexisNexis 1998); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 13-1-405 (West 1999); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985 (West 2000); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.44.150 (West 2009).
188. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a), (b) (2006); United States v. Quintero, 21 F.3d 885
(9th Cir. 1994).
189. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (No. 86-
6757).
190. Id.
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testify using screening measures.191  In Craig, the Court inquired
whether a State, consistent with the Confrontation Clause, could
adopt protective measures for testifying adult witnesses.192  Counsel
agreed that a State could adopt similar protective measures if its deci-
sion were supported by a “demonstrated, compelling public policy.”193
Nevertheless, the Court’s opinion in Craig was unclear as to the
permissible scope of witnesses eligible to be shielded.  Maryland’s
shielding statute applied to child abuse victim-witnesses under the
age of eighteen years,194 but Craig involved young child sex abuse vic-
tim-witnesses between the ages of four and six years old.195  The so-
cial science giving rise to shielding and which the Court referenced
dealt solely with trauma resulting to child sexual abuse victims,196 as
opposed to child witnesses of non-sex-abuse crimes.  Most important,
the Court’s holding in Craig was specifically couched in terms of child
abuse cases,197 rather than cases involving, for example, spousal
abuse observed by the child witness.  As stated by the Court:
[W]e hold that, if the State makes an adequate showing of necessity, the state
interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child
abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure
that permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial against a defen-
dant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant.198
Reading the Craig decision, one is left to ponder whether Craig ap-
plies only to young child sexual abuse victim-witnesses, or more
broadly to all victim-witnesses covered by Maryland’s statute, or even
more broadly to all child victims and witnesses regardless of the na-
ture of the case.  Would the Supreme Court allow the shielding of ado-
lescent child sex abuse victims?  Would the Court sanction shielding of
underage witnesses to sex crimes?  Can shielding apply to juvenile vic-
tims of non-sex crimes?  How would the Court treat youthful wit-
nesses to non-sex crimes?
191. Id. at 44–45.  Counsel did draw one distinction between children and adults.
Counsel asserted that children under the age limitation set forth by the legisla-
ture should be entitled to a presumption of trauma, while individuals over the
age limitation who wanted to testify using a screening procedure should not be
entitled to a presumption of trauma but would have to make an affirmative show-
ing. Id. at 45.
192. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20–21, Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (No. 89-478).  Ini-
tially, the Court asked whether the measure could be adopted for adult victims of
rape or organized crime. Id. at 20.  Counsel for the State then mentioned persons
with mental disabilities. Id.  Subsequently, the Court spoke of adult witnesses
generally, including the elderly. Id.
193. Id. at 21.
194. MD. CODE  ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-303 (West, Westlaw through 2011 legislation);
Craig, 497 U.S. at 842.
195. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 85, at 4, 28.
196. Craig, 497 U.S. at 855.
197. Id.
198. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB203.txt unknown Seq: 27 29-NOV-11 14:14
2011] PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 367
Some observers may conclude that the Court approved shielding
only for young child victim-witnesses of sexual abuse.  However, the
Court’s rationale in Craig seems to be that shielding is a permissible
infringement of the right of confrontation because of the government
interest in child welfare generally.199  If accurate, this broader justifi-
cation supports the conclusion that neither the nature of the case, nor
the relationship of the child to the case, nor the child’s age, should be
dispositive as to whether a juvenile witness should be eligible for
shielding.
Additionally, if the Craig decision relies in whole or in part on em-
pirical data, then it would be nonsensical to limit shielding to young
child sex abuse victim-witnesses.  The reason is that research findings
support shielding for younger children and older children.  Social sci-
ence studies regarding child sex abuse victim-witnesses have ex-
amined the relationship between age and impact of testifying on the
child.200  Evidence suggests that children younger than six years and
older than eleven years may be more negatively impacted by testifying
than other children.201  With respect to very young children, one ex-
planation for the greater impact may be that very young children are
more vulnerable because of immaturity.202  Older children may be
more stressed than young children because of their greater under-
standing of the process of testifying, a sense of the stigma of publicly
discussing sexual abuse, and a lack of ability to control the adjudica-
tory process.203
Researchers also have suggested that concerns about confronta-
tion-induced trauma are warranted for all juvenile witnesses regard-
less of the nature of the case and whether the child is a victim or
199. See supra subsection III.D.2.a.
200. E.g., Goodman et al., supra note 35, at 115–16.  Social science evidence also indi-
cates a gender differential in that females are more negative about testifying
than males. Id. at 116.  Other subgroups of children (and parents) who also
found the process of testifying more traumatizing included more severely abused
children, poor children, and children who were more fearful of the defendant. Id.
at 119.
201. Id. at 115–16.
202. Id.
203. Id.  Anecdotal evidence supports the findings with respect to older child sex abuse
victims.  A case tried in 2004 in the District of Columbia is revealing. See Henri
E. Cauvin, Determination, With a Delicate Touch, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2004, at
D.C. Extra 8.  The case involved an eighteen-year-old trial witness who was sev-
enteen at the time her uncle allegedly raped her. Id.  In the waiting room before
being called to the stand, the teenager reportedly expressed extreme reluctance
to testify. Id.  She said she did not want to testify and that she could not go
through with it. Id.  She clung to the prosecutor and the victim advocate, implor-
ing them not to make her testify. Id.  Ultimately, the young woman managed to
testify in a “halting” manner, and apparently without the benefit of shielding. Id.
Her uncle was convicted. Id.
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witness.204  Goodman, who generated much of the research regarding
the effects of testifying on child sex abuse victims, has acknowledged
that a child witness in a non-sex case, whether in the role of victim or
eye-witness, may be traumatized by testifying in the presence of the
defendant.205  Goodman reasoned that facing the defendant in court
may re-traumatize any victim, regardless of the nature of the of-
fense.206  She also noted that young witnesses who are intimidated by
defendants may fear that they can hurt them in the courtroom.207
Goodman’s work on child witnesses of domestic violence is particu-
larly enlightening.  Relying on studies of child witnesses to intra-fam-
ily violence, she suggests that a child who witnesses domestic violence
or intra-family homicide will be no less traumatized by testifying than
a child sexual abuse victim.208  She further suggests that such a child
may be even more traumatized than a child caught up in a case in
which a stranger committed the sex abuse.209  Children who witness
familial violence may experience re-victimization and conflicting loy-
alties when testifying.210  Moreover, they may fear retaliation if a not
guilty verdict is returned.211  Legal scholar Lucy McGough has
pointed out that there is no proof that child sex abuse victims are
more traumatized than child witnesses to other crimes, and opined
that “[a]ll children deserve special consideration when they serve as
trial witnesses.”212
Social science aside, the similarity of experiences of child victims
and witnesses in sex and non-sex cases would seem to call for equal
access to shielding.  Recent crime data reveals that young child sex
abuse victims are vital to the prosecution of criminal cases, but it also
shows the need for testimony from older children who may be victims
of or witnesses to sex-based crimes.213  Notably, older children are
sexually abused at high rates.214  Indeed, despite the prominence of
sex abuse trials involving very young children, child victims in sex
204. See Gail S. Goodman & Mindy S. Rosenberg, The Child Witness to Family Vio-
lence: Clinical and Legal Considerations, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL 97, 121
(Daniel Jay Sonkin ed., 1987).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Goodman et al., supra note 35, at 120.
208. Goodman & Rosenberg, supra note 204, at 121.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. LUCY S. MCGOUGH, CHILD WITNESSES: FRAGILE VOICES IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM 12 (1994).
213. See HOWARD N. SNYDER, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST., SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG
CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER
CHARACTERISTICS (2000), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
saycrle.pdf.
214. Id. at 2.
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abuse investigations and prosecutions almost as often involve older
juvenile victims.215  The Department of Justice reported in 2000 that
data collected between 1991 and 1996 indicated that sixty-seven per-
cent of all victims of sexual assault reported to law enforcement agen-
cies were juveniles under the age of eighteen years, and of this group,
just under one-half of child victims were twelve to seventeen years of
age.216
Moreover, children of all ages are victims of a wide variety of
crimes committed against them, most often by adults whom they
know.  In 2006, the Department of Justice issued its National Report
on Juvenile Offenders and Victims.217  For 2000 and 2001, twenty-six
percent of the victims of violent crime reported to law enforcement
were juveniles.218  Violent crime includes murder, violent sexual as-
sault, robbery, and aggravated sexual assault.219  More than thirty-
three percent of those victims were under the age of twelve years.220
Twenty-seven percent were between twelve and fourteen years.221
Thirty-six percent were between fifteen and seventeen years.222  In
sixty percent of those cases, the offender was an adult.223  With the
exception of robbery cases, the offenders are almost always acquaint-
ances or family members.224
In light of doctrinal, empirical, and experiential arguments in sup-
port of broadly allowing juveniles who are traumatized by testifying in
the presence of defendants to be shielded, it comes as no surprise that
trial courts have broadly construed the classes of witnesses eligible for
shielding.  Courts have relied on inherent authority and statutory
interpretation to do so.  Subsequent to Craig, two state trial courts
relied on inherent authority to shield child witnesses under circum-
stances not in line with the authorizing shielding statutes.  In Gonza-
les v. State,225 the defendant was charged with murdering his five-
year-old daughter.226  The defendant’s ten-year-old stepdaughter was
alleged to have witnessed the defendant beat her sister to death.227
The defendant was also alleged to have sexually abused the step-
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST., JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT (2006), available at http://www.
ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf.
218. Id. at 31.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 32.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 33.
224. Id.
225. 818 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc).
226. Id. at 757.
227. Id. at 758.
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daughter, and that matter was being prosecuted in a separate case.228
The issue before the Texas appellate court was whether the defen-
dant’s face-to-face confrontation rights were violated when his step-
daughter testified in his murder trial via two-way closed-circuit
television.229  By its terms, the Texas shielding statute only applied to
child victim-witnesses of the offense at issue, and only to certain of-
fenses not including homicide.230  On review, the appellate court con-
cluded that even though the child witness was not covered by the
enabling statute, a trial court had the authority to order shielding so
long as the court made the findings required by the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Craig.231
In Hernandez v. State,232 a trial court permitted the children of a
murder victim to testify via one-way closed-circuit television outside
the presence of the defendant.233  The record indicated that the chil-
dren were seated beside their mother when she was shot to death.234
As in Gonzales, no enabling statute authorized shielding in these cir-
cumstances.235  On appeal of his conviction, the defendant argued
that the use of closed-circuit television violated his right of confronta-
tion because of the lack of an enabling statute and the dictates of
Craig.236  The court, however, rejected the defendant’s arguments.237
Similarly, the federal shield statute presents a problem of ambigu-
ity regarding who can be shielded, and federal courts have broadly
interpreted the statute.  The language of 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b), which is
the specific provision permitting shielding, suggests that only child
victims of abuse may be shielded while testifying; yet, the definition of
“child” within § 3509(a) implies that the shielding measures apply to
child abuse victims as well as child witnesses of crimes against
others.238
Federal courts have endorsed the broader interpretation.  In
United States v. Quintero,239 the trial court allowed a four-year-old
boy who witnessed his sibling’s homicide by their father to testify via
closed-circuit television.240  The boy was the only witness to the defen-
dant’s acts.241  The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the
228. Id.
229. Id. at 757.
230. Id. at 764–65.
231. Id. at 765–66.
232. 597 So. 2d 408 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
233. Id. at 409.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(B) (2006), with 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(2) (2006).
239. 21 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1994).
240. Id. at 892.
241. Id. at 888.
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federal shielding law applies only to child victims and not wit-
nesses.242  Similarly, in United States v. Boyles,243 a three-year-old
witnessed the rape of his mother.244  During trial, the court approved
the prosecution’s request to video-record the child’s testimony so that
he would not have to testify in court in the defendant’s presence.245
Though the defendant had not objected to the shielding mechanism at
trial,246 on appeal of the defendant’s conviction the circuit court ex-
amined the merits of the defendant’s argument challenging the use of
shielding and rejected the claim.247  Lastly, in United States v.
Moses,248 the defendant was indicted for aggravated sexual abuse of a
minor.249  He was alleged to have sexually abused his two-and-a-half-
year-old niece.250  His four-year-old niece allegedly witnessed the
abuse of her sister.251  The trial court permitted the older child to tes-
tify via closed-circuit television, concluding that the child would be
harmed by testifying in the defendant’s presence.252  The circuit court
reversed, holding that the trial court’s findings of fact on this matter
were clearly erroneous and that the error was not harmless.253
Though the court reversed the conviction, it did not suggest that the
trial court erred by allowing a witness to sexual abuse to testify using
shielding protections.254
Can prosecutors seek shielding in the absence of statutory authori-
zation or where statutory language is ambiguous?  The answer is they
do not know.  Trial and appellate courts in both the state and federal
systems have allowed for shielding in circumstances that seem to run
counter to enabling statutes, but these decisions are small in number
and have not been subjected to Supreme Court scrutiny.  Predictably
determining whether the Court will approve of shielding for underage
witnesses who are not very young victims of sex abuse is difficult.  As
explained, the reasoning for the Court’s approval of shielding arguably
extends beyond very young child sex abuse witnesses to all underage
witnesses.  Yet state shielding statutes may not be so broadly crafted
or interpreted, and the scope of the holding of Craig remains con-
tested.  Given these uncertainties, one can only conclude that prosecu-
tors will seldom seek shielding in the absence of clear witness
242. Id. at 892.
243. 57 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 1995).
244. Id. at 537.
245. Id. at 539.
246. Id. at 545.
247. Id. at 546–47.
248. 137 F.3d 894 (6th Cir. 1998).
249. Id. at 896.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 902.
254. See id.
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eligibility lest they expose a successful prosecution to reversal on
appeal.
3. Absence of Clarification
Prosecutors may under-utilize shielding statutes because of the
ambiguous rationale of Craig and unresolved questions as to its appli-
cability.  Worse yet, the Court has repeatedly refused to clarify its de-
cision and remove the obstacles to prosecutorial use of shielding laws.
Opportunities to refine Craig have come to the Court in the form of
petitions for certiorari in cases involving shielding and in the context
of deciding cases that more broadly concern confrontation rights.  This
lack of clarification has likely made prosecutors even more hesitant to
use shielding statutes.
i. Rejecting Direct Review
Twice in the decade following Craig, defendants asked the Court to
consider the breadth of that case.255  Both times the Court rejected
the requests, leading Justice Scalia to dissent.256  The first case, Dan-
ner v. Commonwealth,257 involved a defendant who was convicted of
sodomizing and raping his daughter.258  The daughter was between
five and ten years of age when the offenses occurred.259  By the time
she testified at trial, the defendant’s daughter was fifteen years
old.260  Pursuant to a Kentucky statute regarding the testimony of al-
leged child victims of sexual offenses, the daughter testified outside
the defendant’s presence.261  The statute permitting her testimony
outside the defendant’s presence was ambiguous as to the age require-
ments for child victims to be covered by the statute.262  In particular,
it was unclear whether child sexual assault victims must have been
twelve or younger at the time of trial to benefit from protective mea-
sures or whether they need only have been twelve or younger at the
time of the offense.263  The Kentucky Supreme Court determined that
255. In a third instance, in 2007, the Court was asked to reconsider Craig in light of
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). See Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Vogelsberg v. Wisconsin, 550 U.S. 936 (2007) (No. 06-1253), 2007 WL 776725.
The Court declined the petition without comment or dissent. Vogelsberg, 550
U.S. at 936.
256. See Marx v. Texas, 528 U.S. 1034, 1034–38 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (denial
of certiorari); Danner v. Kentucky, 525 U.S. 1010, 1010–12 (1998) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (same).
257. 963 S.W.2d 632 (Ky. 1998).
258. Id. at 632.
259. Id. at 633.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 633–34.
263. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB203.txt unknown Seq: 33 29-NOV-11 14:14
2011] PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 373
the legislature intended the statute to have the latter, and more
broadly protective, meaning.264  Thus, though the defendant’s daugh-
ter was fifteen at the time of the trial, the court held that she was
rightfully permitted to testify outside the defendant’s presence.265
The Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari,266 but
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, observing: “Craig
hardly contemplate[d] that the child-witness exception is available to
15-year-olds.”267
Justice Scalia’s pointed criticism of the lower court’s ruling in Dan-
ner gives special reason for concern that prosecutors may back away
from invoking shielding statutes.  It is one thing to recognize in the
abstract the possibility that Craig’s holding does not extend to child
witnesses aged fifteen years.  It is another thing to learn that two Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court believe that Craig does not authorize
shielding in such a case.  Here, as elsewhere, ambiguity in the law is
likely to tip the scales of prosecutorial decision-making in the direc-
tion of risk-avoidance and resulting choices not to use the shielding
device.
In the second case, Marx v. State,268 the defendant was convicted
of sexually assaulting a thirteen-year-old.269  At his trial, the victim
and a six-year-old witness to the assault testified via two-way closed-
circuit television.270  The six-year-old had previously been abused by
the defendant, but that abuse was not the subject of her testimony;
rather, she testified only in regards to the abuse of the thirteen-year-
old.271  On appeal, the defendant argued that the protective measure
violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation because shield-
ing was available by statute only to the victim of the offense for which
a defendant is being tried.272  Applying Craig, the state appellate
court rejected the defendant’s Sixth Amendment argument.273  As in
Danner, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certio-
rari,274 and again, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented
from the denial.275  In his opinion, Justice Scalia criticized the Court
for failing to limit the category of witnesses covered by Craig.276  He
commented:
264. Id. at 634.
265. Id.
266. Danner v. Kentucky, 525 U.S. 1010 (1998).
267. Id. at 1011 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
268. 987 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc).
269. Id. at 578, 580.
270. Id. at 579.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 580–81.
274. Marx v. Texas, 528 U.S. 1034 (1999).
275. Id. at 1034–38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
276. See id.
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I do not think the Court should ever depart from the plain meaning of the Bill
of Rights.  But when it does take such a step into the dark it has an obligation,
it seems to me, to clarify as soon as possible the extent of its permitted depar-
ture.  The present case represents an expansion of Craig both as to the cate-
gory of witness covered and as to the finding required.  First, it extends the
holding of that case to a child witness whose abuse is neither the subject of the
prosecution nor will be the subject of her testimony.  The only basis for excus-
ing her from real confrontation with the defendant is that, according to the
prosecution, she also was the subject of sexual abuse, on another occasion, by
the same defendant.  The State’s extension of our novel confrontation-via-TV
jurisprudence to this situation should alone warrant our accepting this case
for review.277
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Marx heightens prosecutorial
uncertainty no less than his dissent in Danner.  To be sure, the Su-
preme Court cannot grant certiorari in every case that raises issues
involving the proper application of Craig.  At the same time, frequent
litigation in the lower courts, together with the Court’s persistent si-
lence on key questions, raises dangers that prosecutors will continue
to err on the side of caution when deciding whether to seek shielding
for child witnesses in criminal cases.
ii. Declining Indirect Reconsideration
The Supreme Court’s recent Confrontation Clause decisions involv-
ing matters other than shielding may also contribute to prosecutorial
reluctance to request use of shielding measures and judicial approval
of such measures.  In Crawford v. Washington,278 decided in 2004, the
Supreme Court effectuated a dramatic theoretical shift in Confronta-
tion Clause jurisprudence.279  In Crawford, the Court departed from
the view of the Confrontation Clause espoused in Ohio v. Roberts,280
which served as the backdrop for Craig.281  The Court in Crawford did
not overrule Craig, but it created conditions that open the door for
reconsideration of Craig’s holding.282  Will the decision in Craig sur-
vive the theoretical shift made by Crawford?  Thus far, defendants’
challenges to the use of shielding procedures in light of Crawford have
been unsuccessful.283  When directly presented with the issue, the Su-
277. Id. at 1035.
278. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
279. See id.
280. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
281. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36; Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
282. See infra subsection III.D.3.b.
283. E.g., United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1313–18 (11th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 553–54 (8th Cir. 2005); Pesquera v. Jackson,
No. 06-CV-10186, 2007 WL 2874219, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 2007); United
States v. Sandoval, No. CR 04-2362 JB, 2006 WL 1228953, at *9–12 (D. N.M.
Mar. 7, 2006); State v. Henriod, 131 P.3d 232, 237 (Utah 2006); State v. Vogel-
sberg, 724 N.W.2d 649, 654 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
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preme Court declined to consider the matter.284  There are reasons for
concluding that Craig’s validation of the shielding measure will and
should survive Crawford.285  Arguments to the contrary, however,
may well contribute to prosecutorial decisions not to use the tool.
When Craig was decided, the Supreme Court conceived of the right
of confrontation as primarily concerned with the admission of trust-
worthy and reliable evidence.286  This view is at the heart of the 1980
case of Ohio v. Roberts,287 which predated Craig.  In Roberts, the
Court was confronted with whether the admission at trial of the pre-
liminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness violated the
Confrontation Clause.288  The Court concluded that reliability and
trustworthiness were the touchstones for the admissibility of hearsay
evidence.289  Thus, the Court held that when a witness was unavaila-
ble to testify at trial, the witness’s out-of-court statements were ad-
missible if they fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception because
statements fitting such exceptions were deemed reliable.290
Craig built on the reliability theory of the right of confrontation
that the Court embraced in Roberts.  Thus, denial of the right of face-
to-face confrontation is permissible only where “necessary to further
an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testi-
mony is otherwise assured.”291  Because shielding does not impact
witness competency, oath requirements, the ability of the defense to
contemporaneously conduct cross-examination, and a jury’s ability to
view the witness to evaluate credibility, the Court concluded that evi-
dence reliability is safeguarded even when shielding is used.292  In the
Court’s view, shielding permits a defendant to uncover a child witness
who makes false accusations as well as favorable testimony.293
284. See Vogelsberg v. Wisconsin, 550 U.S. 936 (2007) (denying certiorari).
285. See infra subsection III.D.3.b.
286. Craig, 497 U.S. at 845–46.
287. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
288. Id. at 58.
289. Id. at 65–66; see also Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987) (stating that
the “right to confrontation is a functional one for the purpose of promoting relia-
bility in a criminal trial”); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (observing that
the “right to confront and to cross-examine witnesses is primarily a functional
right that promotes reliability in criminal trials”); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
89 (1970) (“[T]he mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical
concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials . . . .”).
290. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
291. Craig, 497 U.S. at 850.
292. Id. at 851.
293. Id.  Indeed, studies of the accuracy and reliability of evidence from shielded child
witnesses revealed that shielding did not decrease the reliability of evidence. See
APA Brief, supra note 43, at 20–21.  The fact that a shielded child victim-witness
did not come face-to-face with the defendant did not increase the rate of errone-
ous identification. Id. at 20.  Children who testified without the defendant pre-
sent were less likely to recall incorrect information than children who testified in
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In Crawford, the issue before the Court was whether a witness’s
out-of-court statements made during interrogation by law enforce-
ment officers were properly admitted when the witness was unavaila-
ble to testify at trial.294  Under the Roberts rationale, such statements
were admissible so long as they were deemed reliable.295  The peti-
tioner in Crawford, however, asked the Court to reconsider the Rob-
erts rationale.296
After recounting the history of the Confrontation Clause, begin-
ning with Roman times, the Court in Crawford concluded that the
Clause was designed to prevent the government from using ex parte
examinations as evidence against a defendant.297  Building on this
historical understanding, the Court concluded that the Sixth Amend-
ment bars the admission at trial of “testimonial” statements by a wit-
ness, regardless of reliability, unless the witness is unavailable to
testify at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-ex-
amine the witness.298 Crawford, in effect, reconceived of the confron-
tation right as a procedural protection rather than a substantive
safeguard of reliability as under Roberts.299  Thus, the Clause ensured
reliability of evidence not by a determination of whether evidence is
reliable, but rather by requiring that testimonial evidence be tested by
cross-examination, which has long been deemed the “greatest legal en-
gine” for ascertaining truth.300
the courtroom in a defendant’s presence. Id. at 21.  Studies of child witnesses in
simulated, non-sexual abuse cases indicated that children who testified using
shielding procedures were more accurate and provided more detailed testimony
than children who testified in open court.  Dorothy F. Marsil et al., Child Witness
Policy: Law Interfacing with Social Science, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 209, 222
(2002).  Finally, studies suggested that the use of shielding measures did not fa-
cilitate lying by child witnesses. Id. at 223.
294. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004).
295. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
296. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.
297. Id. at 50.
298. Id. at 68; see also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895) (stressing
the importance of cross-examination to an accused’s constitutional right to con-
frontation by compelling a witness “to stand face to face with the jury in order
that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the
manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief”).  The
Crawford Court declined to define “testimonial.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  It
concluded, however, that the statements at issue were testimonial and inadmissi-
ble because the defendant did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
ness regarding the statements. Id.
299. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61; Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Chil-
dren Too: Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71
BROOK. L. REV. 311, 321 (2005).
300. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (noting that cross-examination is
the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth” (quoting 5
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (3d ed.
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In the wake of Crawford, defense counsel have urged that Craig no
longer can stand as good law.301  This line of reasoning is weakened
by several arguments.  First, Crawford is devoted only to the question
of the admissibility of hearsay and does not take up the question of in-
court physical confrontation, which lies at the heart of Craig.302  The
Supreme Court itself has already drawn just such a line of distinction.
In White v. Illinois,303 decided after Coy and Craig but prior to Craw-
ford, the Court stated:
Coy and Craig involved only the question of what in-court procedures are con-
stitutionally required to guarantee a defendant’s confrontation right once a
witness is testifying.  Such a question is quite separate from that of what re-
quirements the Confrontation Clause imposes as a predicate for the introduc-
tion of out-of-court declarations.304
Second, should the Court have an opportunity to define the nature
of in-court confrontation under the Sixth Amendment, the Court
might conclude that the Confrontation Clause does not require the
witness to testify literally face-to-face with the defendant or in the ac-
tual physical presence of the defendant.305  Thus, shielding would not
violate the Clause.  On the other hand, a historical examination of the
Clause might lead to a different conclusion.  Justice Scalia, the author
of Coy and Crawford, contends that the Confrontation Clause requires
a face-to-face confrontation, meaning a witness must testify in the de-
fendant’s physical presence,306 even though the “face-to-face” lan-
guage is not included in the Sixth Amendment.307
Third, Craig is not inconsistent with the theoretical approach to
confrontation adopted in Crawford, which anointed promotion of the
opportunity for cross-examination as the ultimate aim of the Confron-
1940))); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (stating that evidence should be tested
in the “crucible of cross-examination”).
301. See supra note 283.
302. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850–51 (1990).
303. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
304. Id. at 358.
305. See Raeder, supra note 299, at 316.  In contrast to the Sixth Amendment, the
language of some state constitutions expressly mandates “face-to-face” confronta-
tion. E.g., MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII.  In those instances, courts reviewing
shielding cases have held that any method that limits the ability of the witness to
face the defendant violates the state constitution. E.g., Commonwealth v.
Amirault, 677 N.E.2d 652 (Mass. 1997).
306. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (“We have never doubted . . . that the
Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with wit-
nesses appearing before the trier of fact.”); see also Craig, 497 U.S. at 862 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (“Whatever else it may mean in addition, the defendant’s constitu-
tional right ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him’ means, always and
everywhere, at least what it explicitly says: the ‘right to meet face to face all those
who appear and give evidence at trial.’ ” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Coy, 487
U.S. at 1016)).
307. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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tation Clause.308  Children who are shielded while testifying at trial
remain subject to cross-examination by the defendant.  Indeed, shield-
ing may be seen as encouraging, rather than diminishing, effective
cross-examination by creating a scenario in which a child can appear
in court to testify, and speak more openly in response to defense coun-
sel’s questions, because the emotional trauma of testifying in the de-
fendant’s physical presence has been removed or mitigated.
In the end, there are strong reasons why the Court’s ruling with
regard to the non-hearsay, shielded evidence in Craig should survive
the Court’s ruling with regard to hearsay evidence in Crawford.  Nev-
ertheless, some prosecutors may see Crawford as posing a meaningful
threat to Craig’s continuing vitality.  To the extent this is the case,
prosecutors may take the surer course of action and opt to avoid use of
witness shielding,309 thereby rendering it far less of a protective de-
vice for child witnesses than legislatures intended or envisioned.
It may be that legislators who passed shielding laws foresaw that
financial costs would render their use infeasible in some instances and
that in other cases shielding would serve no useful purpose.  It seems
unlikely, however, that legislators would expect prosecutors not to in-
voke these laws on a large scale, even when costs pose no obstacle and
shielding would in fact serve the needs of child witnesses.  There is,
however, strong evidence that fears about the legal impermissibility of
shielding—both in general and in particular categories of cases—are
driving prosecutors not to employ the device.310  If this is so,
prosecutorial discretion is frustrating the goals of legislatures and the
general public they represent.  Such a condition is deeply problematic,
both because it runs counter to basic principles of democratic self-gov-
ernance and because it undermines the interests of vulnerable child
witnesses demonstrably in need of special protection in the criminal
justice system.
IV. THE REVITALIZATION OF JUVENILE SHIELDING LAWS
How might the lessons learned from the birth and death of juvenile
shielding laws inform future legislative actions respecting the
remediation of in-court intimidation of juvenile witnesses?  This Part
proposes three reforms to juvenile shielding laws aimed at encourag-
ing the utilization of shielding statutes to improve the testimonial ex-
perience of children: (1) expanding the group of persons with standing
to seek shielding at trial, (2) narrowing the class of witnesses for
whom shielding is available through the creation of sharply defined
308. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 55–57 (2004).
309. See Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 592 (2005); Raeder, supra
note 299, at 386.
310. See supra section II.D.
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eligibility criteria, and (3) avoiding reliance on technology to effectu-
ate shielding.
These three reforms respond primarily to the difficulties docu-
mented in the earlier sections of this Article.  However, they also re-
flect an additional concern.  Updating and expanding the social
science research regarding in-court testimony by child witnesses
should be a priority.  The mixed and incomplete empirical data re-
garding the need for shielding and its efficacy cuts in favor of con-
stricting shielding laws for the near term.  More robust data
engendering more widely accepted conclusions would better inform
which children should be shielded, when, and how.  Thus, in addition
to legislative reform, this Article advocates research regarding (1) the
efficacy of shielding by the witness’s age, nature of case, and victim or
witness status; (2) the efficacy of shielding via technology-free and
technology-based means; (3) the efficacy of shielding versus other in-
novations aimed at reducing testimonial trauma; and (4) the modern
juror’s perception of video-based communication for personal or busi-
ness use (e.g., via Skype) as compared to use in court proceedings.311
As further research unfolds, legislatures should reassess and reformu-
late existing shielding statutes.  Until then, the real-world operation
of existing laws, and in particular their widespread disuse, supports
three significant near-term reforms.
A. Standing: Choose Wisely
One lesson of the story of juvenile shielding laws is that legislators
should more carefully select whom to vest with discretion to request
shielding in order to satisfy legislative aims.  Criminal procedure leg-
islation routinely places discretion in the hands of prosecutors.312  In
the shielding context, however, placing discretion in the hands of pros-
ecutors has frustrated legislative goals.  Legislators aimed at improv-
ing the experiences of child witnesses who testify at trial, while
simultaneously facilitating effective prosecution.313  More particu-
larly, they sought to ease the trauma to child witnesses and increase
the likelihood of conviction by facilitating the receipt of testimony
from child witnesses.314  Undoubtedly, legislators expected both chil-
dren and prosecutors to be pleased by and in favor of using this new
tool.  Yet, legislatures did not always place the option to invoke shield-
ing laws in the hands of children themselves, choosing more often in-
311. See also SUSAN R. HALL & BRUCE D. SALES, COURTROOM MODIFICATIONS FOR
CHILD WITNESSES 261–64 (2008) (setting forth future research agenda).
312. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Dis-
cretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 20–25 (1998) (describing prosecutors’ vast discre-
tion and power).
313. Goodman et al., supra note 42, at 256.
314. Id.
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stead to leave this decision to prosecutors.315  This assignment of
authority is deeply troubling because it turns out prosecutors do not
use the device for a host of reasons.316
Prosecutors’ choices not to use shielding are at odds with legisla-
tive purposes because one goal of shielding laws was clearly to protect
child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in the presence of de-
fendants.317  Put simply, legislators were mistaken in expecting that
prosecutors would prioritize the interests of children if such interests
undermined the likelihood of convictions.  Seemingly, prosecutors are
primarily motivated by convictions and not by providing collateral
benefits to witnesses when those benefits might undermine the
chances of conviction, even if only to a small degree.318  This conclu-
sion is buttressed by the expressed preference of prosecutors for live,
in-court, un-shielded testimony by the child, which is perceived to be a
more compelling presentation of evidence for the jury’s benefit.319
Shielding laws had another important purpose, in addition to pro-
tecting children from emotional harm.  Legislators anticipated that
shielding would increase both the availability and quality of testimony
from children, thus facilitating law enforcement efforts.320  If the leg-
islative goal was to facilitate convictions, however, it is unclear
whether shielding works to advance this aim.  Interestingly, prosecu-
tors’ perceptions regarding the inefficacy of shielding in obtaining con-
victions may be accurate.  Using mock trials, researchers have
examined the impact of shielding on juror decisions and trial out-
comes.321  While no consensus has emerged, some analysts have con-
cluded that shielding correlates with favorable outcomes for
defendants, at least in mock trials.322  On this point, however, the evi-
dence is sketchy and additional research is clearly needed.323
In reality, shielding laws are designed to be dual-purposed—both
to protect children and to facilitate the receipt of testimony—and
these dual purposes suggest shielding laws should be re-configured to
authorize children to request shielding and to permit courts to raise
315. See supra note 104.
316. See supra section II.D.
317. Goodman et al., supra note 42, at 256.
318. Id. at 272.
319. WHITCOMB, supra note 39, at 65 (stating that “[m]ost prosecutors prefer to offer a
live witness whenever possible”); see also AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST.,
supra note 18, at 455 (“A televised image of the child victim is not as effective as a
child’s live testimony.”).
320. Goodman et al., supra note 42, at 256; see supra section II.B.
321. E.g., Gail S. Goodman et al., Face-to-Face Confrontation: Effects of Closed-Circuit
Technology on Children’s Eyewitness Testimony and Jurors’ Decisions, 22 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 165 (1998).
322. See id. at 199.
323. See HALL & SALES, supra note 311, at 84–86 (describing results of studies and
concluding more research is needed).
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the issue sua sponte.  Prosecutors should be given a voice on the
shielding question, but giving prosecutors complete discretion ignores
the reality that their motivations and risk aversion may not align with
the interests of child witnesses.
One expected critique of this proposal is that it is inappropriate
and unprecedented to allow a non-party to significantly influence the
course of conduct of a trial.  A related criticism is that affording a child
witness the ability to request shielding amounts to rights-granting
that is unorthodox and unwarranted.  In actuality, giving children
standing to request shielding would not undermine the two-party ad-
versarial nature of the trial system or the normative values and goals
of the trial process.  Prosecutors would retain authority to choose
which witnesses to call to testify and to consent to or dissent from
shielding requests.  A defendant would also be able to object to a
child’s shielding request.  Granting standing to a child witness only
provides an opportunity to be heard; it does not guarantee a right to
shielding.
Allowing children standing to request a shielding order is also not
an unprecedented legislative approach inconsistent with criminal pro-
cedure norms.  The federal government’s child shielding statute
grants standing to the child, prosecutor, or a guardian ad litem.324
Likewise, the Uniform Child Witness Testimony by Alternative Meth-
ods Act (UCWTAMA or the Act) proposed by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Conference) takes such an
approach.325  The Act allows a litigant, the child, or an individual with
“sufficient standing” to act on behalf of the child to request a hear-
ing.326  Outside of the shielding context, legislatures have granted vic-
tims the ability—independent of the prosecutor—to be heard during
plea bargaining and sentencing.327  Such allowance is a recognition
that victims’ interests and needs may not align with or be satisfied by
prosecutors’ strategic litigation choices.328  The existence of these pro-
324. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(A) (2006).
325. See UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALT. METHODS ACT § 4(a), 12 U.L.A. 85
(2002).  Four states have enacted the UCWTAMA: Idaho, New Mexico, Nevada,
and Oklahoma.  IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 9-1801 to -1808 (West 2005); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 50.500–.620 (2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 2611.3–.11 (2011); H.B. 196,
50th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2011) (effective July 1, 2012).
326. UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALT. METHODS ACT § 4(a), 12 U.L.A. at 85.
327. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006) (federal statute granting victims rights to be heard
at plea bargaining and sentencing); Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime
Victims’ Rights: Standing, Remedy, and Review, 2005 BYU L. REV. 255, 331–32
(2005) (describing development of crime victims’ rights at state level).
328. See, e.g., Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Turning a Blind Eye: Perjury in Domestic Vio-
lence Cases, 39 N.M. L. REV. 149, 179–82 (2009) (describing tensions between
domestic violence victims and prosecutors); Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participa-
tion in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L. Q. 301, 310–11 (1987) (describing diver-
gence of victims’ and prosecutors’ interests in plea bargaining context).
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tective measures for third parties provides support for child witness
standing in the shielding context.
B. The Protected Class: Broaden and Narrow
The many uncertainties that surround interpretation and applica-
tion of shielding laws may signal to prosecutors that the laws are un-
stable and therefore should not be utilized.  It is not worth investing
resources to pursue use of the measure if the request is not likely to be
granted, or if granted, the risk of reversal on appeal is significant.
Creating greater predictability in the approval of shielding requests
may heighten use.  As more predictable rules lead prosecutors to seek
shielding orders and courts to grant requests more frequently, oppor-
tunities may arise for the Supreme Court to review shielding laws
thereby increasing the clarity of this area of law.
How should legislatures modify shielding laws to foster certainty?
Generally, increasing requests by prosecutors to shield may be accom-
plished if legislatures expand the class of witnesses eligible for shield-
ing while simultaneously imposing particular and stringent
requirements for granting shielding requests.  To begin, future shield-
ing laws should expand eligibility to all juvenile witnesses in any type
of criminal case.  A bright-line rule that covers all minors in cases
would negate potentially nettlesome problems of statutory interpreta-
tion. Craig arguably does not require, and existing empirical data
does not support, limiting shielding to the very young child victim in a
sex abuse case.  Next, to counter-balance this expansion, future
shielding laws should impose strict standards and direct attention to
specific factors that courts apply when considering shielding requests.
The UCWTAMA again provides a valuable model for this sug-
gested change.  The Act avoids many of the complications wrought by
state legislative enactments and the Supreme Court’s constitutional
review of shielding.  First, the Act broadly applies to criminal proceed-
ings of any nature.329  On the other hand, most state shielding stat-
utes apply only to criminal proceedings involving physical or sexual
abuse.330  The Conference was aware of these narrow ranges of appli-
cability when it drafted and adopted the Act.331  The Conference did
not, however, deem the nature of the case wholly irrelevant to the de-
cision whether to use alternative methods.  In the final version of the
rule, the nature of the case is a factor that must be considered by the
329. UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALT. METHODS ACT § 2 cmt., 12 U.L.A. at 83.
By broadly defining “criminal proceeding,” the Act also applies to juvenile delin-
quency proceedings. Id. § 3, 12 U.L.A. at 84.
330. See supra note 186.
331. UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALT. METHODS ACT 4 (Discussion Draft
2001), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucwtbama/CHILD
601.pdf [hereinafter UCWTAMA DRAFT].
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judge in determining whether to allow the use of an alternative
method.332
Second, by its terms, the Act applies to all child witnesses regard-
less of relationship to the case, unlike many state statutes which limit
shielding to child victim-witnesses.333  “Child witness” is defined to
mean “an individual under the age of [13] who has been or will be
called to testify in a proceeding.”334  Thus, “child witness” naturally
includes both child victims and witnesses.  Moreover, the Act’s draft-
ing history suggests that the child’s relationship to the case is not a
relevant consideration for whether shielding should be approved.
During the early stages of drafting, the child’s relationship to the case
was an express factor to be considered in whether alternative methods
should be utilized.335  Over the course of drafting, however, this factor
was eliminated from the express list of considered factors.336
Finally, the Act does not apply solely to young children, as does the
legislation in some jurisdictions,337 but extends to pre-adolescents as
well.  The Conference’s use of brackets around “13” in the definition of
“child witness” was intended to reconcile the varying age limitations
adopted by the states permitting testimony to be taken by alternative
means.338  As the Act points out, states have adopted widely varying
age cut-offs.339  Georgia is on the low side at ten years of age,340 while
Florida sets the cut-off at sixteen years of age.341  The Conference rec-
ommends that the maximum age for a juvenile to give testimony by an
alternative method stand at thirteen years.342  Given the use of brack-
ets, however, the Conference has signaled that states are free to
choose an age limit that is in accord with local values.343
In addition to expanding the class of witnesses eligible for shield-
ing, the Act imposes particular and stringent requirements beyond
those dictated in Craig with respect to whether shielding may be uti-
lized in any particular case, resolving several open questions in the
process.344  The Act provides:
The child may testify other than face-to-face with the defendant if the presid-
ing officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child would suffer
332. UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALT. METHODS ACT § 6(3), 12 U.L.A. at 89.
333. See supra note 187.
334. UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALT. METHODS ACT § 2(2), 12 U.L.A. at 83
(brackets in original).
335. UCWTAMA DRAFT, supra note 331, § 2(4)(d).
336. See UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALT. METHODS ACT § 6, 12 U.L.A. at 89.
337. See supra note 185.
338. UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALT. METHODS ACT § 2 cmt., 12 U.L.A. at 83.
339. Id.
340. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55(a) (West 2005).
341. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (West 2010).
342. UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALT. METHODS ACT § 2 cmt., 12 U.L.A. at 83.
343. See id.
344. See id. § 5(a)(2), 12 U.L.A. at 87.
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serious emotional trauma that would substantially impair the child’s ability
to communicate with the finder of fact if required to be confronted face-to-face
by the defendant.345
As indicated, the Act adopts a clear and convincing standard,346
though Craig did not prescribe a particular standard for trial courts to
apply.347  Further, with respect to the necessity standard dictated by
Craig,348 the Act requires the court to consider a number of factors to
finally determine whether an alternative method will be employed to
prevent witness trauma.349  The factors include: the reasonably avail-
able alternative methods, whether there are other means available for
protecting the child without using an alternative method, the type of
case, the parties’ rights, the importance of the child’s testimony, “the
nature and degree of emotional trauma that the child may suffer if an
alternative method is not used,” and all other relevant factors.350  If
other methods sufficient to protect the child without interfering with
physical confrontation exist, then resort to an alternative method is
not necessary, which is consistent with, and a stronger version of,
Craig’s necessity requirement.351  While the Act does not dictate how
each factor should be weighed individually and collectively, it does dic-
tate specific considerations for trial courts to consider that the Su-
preme Court in Craig did not specify.  While courts may still vary in
application of the factors, a specific list at least focuses the litigants,
and trial and appellate courts, on the same variables, thus improving
predictability.
A critique meriting consideration is that expanding the practical
availability of shielding in effect expands infringement of defendants’
rights and interests.  Such expansion, it could be argued, should be
judiciously undertaken, particularly when there are concerns regard-
ing shielding’s efficacy to reduce trauma.  Admittedly, one likely—and
unintended—consequence of the reforms advanced herein will be to
increase the absolute number of cases in which shielding occurs.  Yet,
any danger posed to defendants by the expansion of shielding is sub-
stantially mitigated by the imposition of strict requirements for ulti-
mately allowing shielding.  Thus, the overall number of cases in which
shielding is requested will likely increase, but each particular case
will be more closely scrutinized for necessity than under prior versions
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990).
348. See id. at 855–56.
349. UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALT. METHODS ACT § 6, 12 U.L.A. at 89.  An
early draft of the Act explicitly required a finding of necessity before an alterna-
tive method could be used.  UCWTAMA DRAFT, supra note 331, § 2(1).  This lan-
guage was deleted from the final version. See UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY
BY ALT. METHODS ACT § 6, 12 U.L.A. at 89.
350. UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALT. METHODS ACT § 6, 12 U.L.A. at 89.
351. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 855–56.
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of shielding laws.  In short, granting more children the ability to se-
cure shielding protections should not, given the broader context in
which shielding decisions are made, lead to substantial infringements
of defendants’ rights.
C. Means: Avoid the Lure of New Technologies
Data reveals that prosecutors have not used shielding because it is
cost-prohibitive or because cheaper innovations may accomplish the
same goals or are less risky.352  Many state shielding statutes specify
that shielding will be accomplished through the use of out-of-court-
room testimony via closed-circuit television.353  Such statutes require
the availability of electronic technology to effectuate closed-circuit tel-
evision (e.g., monitors, cameras, microphones, speakers), private phys-
ical space outside the courtroom for the witness to testify, and
manpower to utilize and maintain the technology.354  These require-
ments may create undesirable, substantial outlays for jurisdictions.355
On the other hand, low-cost and low-technology means of shielding
exist, including the use of a physical screen, the alteration of the phys-
ical layout of the courtroom, or relocation of persons in the court-
room.356  Additionally, depending on the particularities of any case,
other low-cost non-shielding innovations may remediate trauma to a
child that may occur because of the defendant’s presence.  For exam-
ple, prior to trial, preparing the child through a visit to the courtroom,
counseling, or testimony prep sessions may be helpful.357  During
trial, the presence nearby of an adult attendant or companion animal
may facilitate the child’s testimony.358  These measures exist along-
side modern era shielding technologies.
During the initial adoption of shielding, legislators would have
been wise to avoid enacting statutes that mandated shielding via
high-technology means.  Their choice to embrace technology was not
viewed positively by prosecutors who lacked funding to implement the
measure, or who could find funding but observed that use of technolo-
gies would divert resources from other areas of need.359
The concerns of prosecutors suggest two useful improvements.
First, statutes should not specify that shielding is to be accomplished
only through use of electronic technologies.  Society embraces techno-
logical advances.  More technology is viewed as a net benefit.  Draw-
352. See supra section II.D.
353. See supra section II.B.
354. See HALL & SALES, supra note 311, at 33–34.
355. AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., supra note 18, at 455.
356. See supra section II.B.
357. Goodman et al., supra note 42, at 267.
358. Id.
359. See id. at 270; supra section II.D.
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backs to technology are often ignored or minimized.  In this instance,
legislators needlessly circumscribed the technologies that may be uti-
lized for shielding.  Prosecutors and courts long used low-technology
means for shielding, and these means have been used effectively.360
There is no reason to eliminate the use of a wide variety of shielding
mechanisms.  Statutes should be drafted to allow for both low- and
advanced-technology shielding.361  Here again, the UCWTAMA is in-
structive.  When the use of an “alternative method” is approved under
the Act, technology may or may not play a role in implementation.362
Technology-based alternative methods include the use of video-record-
ings of children’s testimony and the employment of one-way or two-
way closed-circuit television to contemporaneously transmit the
child’s testimony from a location outside the courtroom into the court-
room where the defendant remains.363  Arranging the courtroom or
participants to avoid direct confrontation between the child witness
and defendant is also permitted.364  Second, if legislatures are going
to dictate a particular form of high-technology shielding, they should
allocate sufficient funding to renovate courthouses, purchase technol-
ogy, and provide for the necessary personnel.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has considered the criminal justice system’s experi-
ence with juvenile shielding laws.  Its aims were two-fold: to show why
prosecutors have neglected to use this innovation and to ascertain
whether and how it might be revitalized to the benefit of children.
The Article concludes that the initial legislative design and subse-
quent Supreme Court approval of juvenile shielding statutes under-
standably contributed to prosecutorial disregard of their existence.
Nevertheless, when prosecutors neglect to use the statutes, they po-
tentially leave needy child witnesses un-shielded.  The Article recom-
mends that shielding laws be redesigned in three respects to take
account of past failings.  The next generation of shielding statutes
should vest standing in children, broaden the eligible applicant pool to
all juvenile witnesses while setting forth specific standards to ensure
that only those who would benefit from shielding are granted ap-
proval, and move away from reliance on electronic technology to im-
plement shielding.
In closing, it is worth considering for a moment whether the reform
proposals advanced herein will be embraced.  These reforms are
360. See, e.g., AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., supra note 18, at 326–27.
361. E.g., UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALT. METHODS ACT § 5 cmt., 12 U.L.A.
87 (2002).
362. See id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
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driven in large part by a desire to take fair account of the interests of
child witnesses caught up in the criminal justice process.  By defini-
tion, they are vulnerable and at-risk through no fault of their own.
Thus, the legal system should take the greatest possible care to pro-
tect their interests under the circumstances.  The changes suggested
here are in keeping with current data and should be reconsidered in
light of new data that becomes available.
Finally, the remedies suggested do not significantly threaten the
interests of criminal defendants.  First, these revisions are aimed at
reaching the neediest child witnesses.  Though the reforms proposed
may expand the total number of applications for shielding, it should
be approved in only the direst of cases.  Second, empirical data hints
that jurors were not biased against defendants in cases in which
shielding was used.365  Third, a leading alternative recommendation
is far more troubling than the proposals advanced in this Article.
Some children’s advocates have proposed measures that would allow
for prosecution without the child witness appearing at all to testify in
court before the jury and before the defendant.366  The proposals of-
fered here do not embrace such a radical departure from longstanding
adversarial practice.  Rather, targeted reform of shielding laws that
will reduce trauma to child witnesses who need help, but not result in
an unnecessary increase in the use of shielding or unfair or erroneous
convictions, is recommended.
365. See HALL & SALES, supra note 311, at 84–86 (describing results of studies and
concluding more research needed).
366. See id. at 255 (recommending admission of videotaped hearsay testimony in lieu
of in-court testimony to protect child witnesses from the trauma of courtroom
confrontation); SHARED HOPE INT’L ET AL., REPORT FROM THE U.S. MID-TERM RE-
VIEW ON THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN AMERICA 16
(2006) (“Procedural reforms are also needed to allow prosecution of perpetrators
without victim/witness testimony.”).
